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Members of Parliament are minimally accountable for their issue
stances (and they know it)
ANONYMISED AUTHOR(S) Anonymised Institution(s)
F or incumbents to be accountable for their issue stances, voters must sanctionincumbents whose positions are ‘out of step’ with their own. We test the electoralaccountability of British legislators for their stance on Brexit. We find that there
is very limited issue accountability. Individuals who disagreed with their representative’s
stance on Brexit were three percentage points less likely to vote for them. The aggregate
consequences of these individual effects are limited. A one-standard deviation increase in
the proportion of constituents agreeing with their incumbent’s Brexit stance is associated
with an increase of 0.56 percentage points in incumbent vote share. These effects are ~1.5
times larger when the main challenger has a different Brexit stance to the incumbent. A
follow-up survey of Members of Parliament (MPs) shows that MPs’ estimates of the effects
of congruence are similar in magnitude. Our findings suggest that issue accountability is
conditional in nature and limited in magnitude even for an issue such as Brexit which should
be maximally amenable to such effects.
Word Count: 11,136
INTRODUCTION
In June 2016, voters in the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU). The
surprise outcome ran counter to opinion in parliament: 75% of Members of Parliament (MPs), and
56% and 95% of Conservative and Labour MPs respectively, had campaigned for the UK to remain
in the EU. Ten months after the referendum the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, called an early
election in which her Conservative Party increased its vote share but lost seats. Some surprising
Conservative losses in the 2017 general election occurred in areas that had voted to Remain, but where
the incumbent Conservative MP had supported Leave. Defeats in Kensington and Canterbury — seats
which had been Conservative since their creation — raised the question of whether Remain voters,
regardless of whether they had become generally less likely to support the Conservatives, had punished
Anonymised submission.





































































































































Leave-supporting incumbents in particular (Chaffin 2017). More generally, the 2017 election raised
the issue of whether incumbent MPs were held electorally accountable for their issue stances on Brexit.
The topic of legislators’ electoral accountability for their issue stances is common enough in studies
of the United States (US) Congress (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002; Ansolabehere and Jones 2010; Nyhan
et al. 2012). It has not, however, been a common topic in studies of other countries in general or British
politics in particular. Strong party discipline means that most MPs’ issue stances are the same as their
party’s. Even when party discipline does not apply, the views of legislators from the same party are
often identical (Norton 2003). What within-party disagreement does exist is usually found on “matters
of conscience”: issues which parties agree to leave to the individual moral convictions of their MPs,
and which are not salient at general elections. Thus, while it is common to find explanations of voting
behavior based on holding parties accountable for their competence or issue positions (Green and
Hobolt 2008), the predominant assumption in British politics has been that although “the elector’s
support of a candidate may involve a calculus of policy choices. . . it is a calculus to which the
parliamentary candidate adds little beyond his adherence to party” (Butler and Stokes 1971, 512).
Accordingly, there have been few studies on the accountability of individual MPs for their issue stances
(as distinct from valence characteristics). The existing literature on electoral accountability for issue
stances is almost entirely based on the experiences of incumbents in the US, a presidential system with
weak political parties which might therefore be regarded as a favorable environment for individual
rather than party-based electoral accountability.
The post-referendum election, which combines a high salience issue with internal party division,
offers an important opportunity to test whether individual MPs are sanctioned when they adopt positions
which are “out of step” with their constituents. Our paper uses data from several waves of the British
Election Study (BES) (Fieldhouse et al. 2018) to test whether Leave- (Remain-) supporting voters were
less likely to vote for Remain- (Leave-) supporting MPs, controlling for respondents’ pre-referendum
propensity to vote for the incumbent’s party and other respondent and constituency characteristics. We
are able to show that respondents were aware of incumbents’ issue stances on Brexit, and that a small
negative effect comes from being “out of step”. However we find that the effect of being out of step is






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
(but still limited) where Leave-supporting incumbents faced a Remain-supporting challenger, and vice
versa. We conclude that voters generally have the motive to sanction “out of step” incumbents, but
that only some voters have the opportunity to select better alternatives.
We then compare our findings on the actual electoral effects of being out of step with information
on perceptions of the effects of being out of step. We presented a sample of MPs with vignettes of
actual constituency contests and asked MPs to estimate how incumbents in the 2017 election would have
performed if they had adopted a more (or less) congruent position. Investigating perceptions of electoral
accountability is important because it is perceptions that give MPs reasons to act in particular ways,
and because MPs may still be incentivized to adopt congruent positions if they believe (falsely) that the
effects of being out of step are large. We show, however, that MPs’ beliefs in electoral sanctioning are
consistent with the small effects we find in our analysis of the BES data. We interpret this to mean that
legislators in the UK know they are only minimally accountable for their issue stances. We conclude
by reflecting on the generalizability of our findings to other systems which use single-member districts,
and the normative implications of our findings for electoral system choice.
LITERATURE
This article is about accountability. Many things — governments, parties, presidents — can be held
accountable, but this article is about the accountability of individual legislators to voters. Voters can
hold legislators accountable in different ways, but the most common accountability mechanism is
sanctioning an incumbent by not voting for them.
Legislators can be held accountable on different grounds: either because they have done something
which everyone regards as bad (or good), inwhich casewemight talk about valence-based accountability,
or because they have taken a position which is distant from voters’ own position, in which case we talk
about accountability for issue stances. The latter type of accountability is most easily investigated
in single member districts, with legislators’ stances assessed relative to some summary measure of
district opinion. Where issue stances are binary rather than continuous, we describe issue stances as
being “congruent” or “in step” with constituency opinion if the legislator’s stance is the same as the





































































































































Studies have shown that, generally, Congressional incumbents with extreme positions do worse
than incumbents with moderate positions (Canes-Wrone et al. 2011), and that American voters are
more likely to vote for incumbents with whom they agree more (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010).
Accountability for specific issue stances has been demonstrated across different issue areas: crime
(Canes-Wrone et al. 2011), trade (Jacobson 1996) and health-care (Nyhan et al. 2012). This literature
has identified necessary conditions for accountability for issue stances, and moderators of the strength
of issue-based sanctioning. For legislators to be held accountable for their issue stances, those stances
must be out of step with district opinion, and information about the incumbent’s issue stance must be
widely available (Nyhan et al. 2012). Sanctioning is moderated by the salience of the issue (Bovitz
and Carson 2006), the composition of the electorate (Griffin and Flavin 2007), the importance of the
electoral contest (Rogers 2017), and whether the incumbent faces a challenger whose issue stances
are more congruent than their own (Hollibaugh et al. 2013). Being out-of-step has substantively
meaningful effects in Congressional contests for some important issues, but does not have meaningful
effects in elections to state legislatures. Nyhan et al. (2012, p. 859), for example, find that voting for
the Affordable Care Act (ACA, generally unpopular when introduced) cost incumbents around eight
percentage points. Highton (2019) finds that ACA mattered, but that other issues — like financial
regulation and repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy — had no substantively significant effects.
Rogers (2017, p. 559), in a study of accountability of state legislators, finds that a standard deviation
increase in congruence improves incumbents’ vote share by just 0.7 percentage points.
The problem with this literature is that it deals almost exclusively with the US. To our knowledge,
only two published papers and a handful of analyses (in appendices to the Nuffield Election Studies)
have directly assessed the accountability of individual legislators outside the US for their issue stances.
Vivyan andWagner (2012), in a study of rebelliousness in the UK Labour Party, find that the probability
of voting for an incumbent Labour MP was greater among respondents who shared the MP’s position
on the Iraq War. This effect is both specific to one party (only two Conservative MPs rebelled over
Iraq), and imprecisely estimated: the 95% confidence interval on the change in the probability of voting
for the incumbent ran from -4 to +6 percentage points, with a point estimate of 1.2 percentage points.






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
0.2 percentage points. Pattie et al. (1994) studied the electoral consequences of several free votes in the
1987-1992 parliament using a factorial ANOVA, and found that MPs who supported two “populist”
(and popular) measures — softening the poll tax and restoring the death penalty — gained 0.9 and 0.5
percentage points respectively (no confidence intervals reported). As with Vivyan and Wagner (2012),
this analysis is restricted to one party. Unlike Vivyan and Wagner (2012), it only operates as a test of
issue accountability under the assumption that these votes were uniformly popular. Analyses of other
issues likewise find few effects, concluding variously that “there is no evidence that capital punishment,
immigration or any local issue had significant effects” (King and Butler 1966, 263), or (more relevant
to our case) that there is no evidence that positions on European Monetary Union had any effect (Butler
and Kavanagh 1997, 308).
There is almost no work on issue-based sanctioning outside the US, but there has been extensive
research on valence-based sanctioning in systems with stronger parties, covering not only incumbency
(Lee 2008; Smith 2013) and scandals (Banducci and Karp 1994; Basinger 2013; Eggers and Fisher
2011) but also signs of effort (Sulkin et al. 2015), independent-mindedness (Kam 2009, 103-129;
Vivyan and Wagner 2012; Campbell et al. 2019), and other positively-valued attributes. This research
has identified substantively meaningful effects in both the US and the UK. These are plotted in Figure
1, together with effects from studies of issue-based accountability.
This literature asks whether voters do in fact hold incumbents accountable. However, accountability
can also be secured if legislators (falsely) believe that they will be held accountable. There are reasons
to think that MPs may believe just this. In social psychology, the “spotlight effect” (Gilovich et al. 2000)
refers to the tendency to over-estimate the salience of our own actions, relative to how they are perceived
by others. It is reasonable to believe that politicians (individuals who score highly on measures of
narcissism and low on measures of humility: Blais et al. 2019) are also subject to this “egocentric bias”,
and believe (falsely) that many of their constituents are aware of, and responsive to, their votes. Like
many cognitive biases (Chen et al. 1996), the spotlight effect may be counteracted by the (electoral)
incentive to form accurate impressions of voters’ beliefs, but studies of politicians’ beliefs have shown
that politicians can hold persistent incorrect beliefs about voters, who they regard as (variously) more





































































































































FIGURE 1. Selected effects of valence- and issue-based accountability. Estimates with no
reported confidence intervals are plotted with a triangle.
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MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
than they really are, and more like groups they meet regularly (Pereira 2020). To our knowledge, only
one paper (Skovron 2018) has directly examined politicians’ beliefs about accountability, but it does so
by examining politicians’ beliefs about antecedent processes such as differential turnout, rather than
directly asking politicians about the electoral effects of particular stances. There is therefore a gap
in the literature for studies of politicians which directly assess politicians’ beliefs about the electoral
penalties of issue stances, in a way which minimizes politicians’ desire to present their own actions as
consequential.
CONTEXT
We assume a working knowledge of the 2016 Brexit referendum and the 2017 general election (an
overview is provided in Cowley and Kavanagh (2018)). Instead of providing a chronological overview,
we identify six basic facts about the referendum and the election which make it appropriate to study
issue accountability in this context.
First, MPs adopted positions on the referendum that were widely reported. The informal referendum
campaign began on February 19 2016 when then-Prime Minister David Cameron returned from a
European Council with “a new settlement” for the UK within the EU.1 Within a week, 85% of MPs
had “declared” for either Leave or Remain, either through individual statements or through the two
campaign organizations, Vote Leave and Britain Stronger in Europe. The positions of individual
MPs were reported on the BBC website, and in the national and local press.2 Although this does not
guarantee that constituents were aware of MPs’ positions, it does show that this information was widely
available. One necessary condition for issue accountability — “the dissemination of information about
the [issue stance] itself” (Nyhan et al. 2012, 849) — is therefore met.
Second, MPs’ positions revealed significant within-party division in the two largest parties. While
1“European Council meeting – Conclusions”, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/
21787/0216-euco-conclusions.pdf
2See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35616946, https://www.mirror.






































































































































the smaller parties either uniformly supported leaving the EU (UK Independence Party, UKIP) or
opposed it (Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, The Green Party), Labour and
Conservative parliamentarians campaigned for both sides. While a majority (56%) of Conservative
MPs— including David Cameron— campaigned for Remain, the Conservative party as an organization
was formally neutral in the referendum (Shipman 2016, 88). Labour’s position was less equivocal, but
enough Labour MPs campaigned for Leave (10 of 228) to test of whether these MPs benefited from
their position. This within-party division is a further necessary condition for identifying individual
issue accountability: if there is no within-party division, it is impossible to distinguish the effects of an
individual MPs’ position from the effects of their party affiliation. For this reason, we can only study
the individual issue accountability of Labour and Conservative MPs, since these were the only parties
which were divided on the issue of Brexit.
Third, because of the result, many MPs were revealed to have adopted out of step positions. This
was particularly true for Labour MPs. Because the referendum was counted in local authority areas,
rather than Westminster constituencies, there are no official records of how each constituency voted,
but estimates (Hanretty 2017) suggest that around half of MPs were out of step with their constituents
on Brexit. This figure was higher for Labour MPs (around 60%) and Remain-supporting MPs (58%)
than it was for Conservative MPs (46%) and Leave-supporting MPs (21%).3 Although Conservative
MPs were more in step with their constituents, the degree of congruence for both parties was low.
Fourth, the subsequent 2017 election was about Brexit, both in its inception and in how voters
approached it. The next general election after 2015 would ordinarily have taken place in 2020, but
Theresa May — Cameron’s replacement as Prime Minister — decided to initiate an early election. Her
rationale for doing so was that other parties in Parliament were “[jeopardizing] the work we must do to
prepare for Brexit at home and. . . [weakening] the government’s negotiating position in Europe.”4
Although they might not have accepted this analysis, voters agreed that Brexit was the most important
issue in the election: 36% of respondents to the post-election BES face-to-face survey cited Brexit or
3These figures are based on MPs who declared a position prior to the referendum. They exclude a number of
parliamentary office-holders (Speakers and Deputy Speakers) as well as MPs who did not declare a position.































































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
FIGURE 2. Change in incumbent vote shares as a function of Leave vote share in each con-
stituency, plotted separately by party, for 514 Labour or Conservative MPs with a declared
position before the 2016 referendum and who stood again in 2017
Conservative incumbents Labour incumbents

























Referendum stance Leave Remain
Europe as the most important issue facing the country, much higher than the percentage that identified
health or the National Health Service (NHS) (11%); terrorism (6%); or the economy (10%).5 This
is extremely unusual for an “episodic” issue like Brexit.6 The issue of Brexit was therefore highly
significant.
Fifth, there were significant links between the Leave share in each constituency and parties’ shares
5These percentages are based on regular expression matching the free-text entries reported in the British Election
Study face-to-face survey. The case-insensitive search terms were “Brexit|Europ|\<EU\>”, “health|NHS”,
“terror|isis”, and “econ|job|wage|employ” respectively.
6An examination of other episodic issues in British political history shows that although the poll tax was for
a brief point (February to June 1990) the most important issue in British politics, but it had ceased to be the
most important issue by the time of the 1992 election: on this, see https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/
en-uk/important-issues-facing-britain. War in Iraq was, under the heading of national defence, the
most important issue in February and March of 2003, but by the 2005 election it had become the fifth most
important issue after immigration, crime, health and the economy (Johns 2010, 149). Covid-19 has since





































































































































of the vote. Figure 2 shows changes in the vote shares of Conservative (left panel) and Labour (right
panel) incumbents as a function of the Leave share in each constituency, with separate symbols and
trend lines for MPs who campaigned for Remain and for Leave. Conservative incumbents increased
their vote share more in constituencies which had voted more heavily to Leave. The pattern for Labour
was the reverse. Analysis of individual-level evidence also shows significant switching according to
Brexit position (Mellon et al. 2018). If the issue of Brexit was salient enough to have affected party
vote shares, it is plausible that it was salient enough to have affected individual candidates’ vote shares.
Sixth, the UK is a case where it makes most sense to study issue accountability. It is in single-
member districts where the idea of legislators’ individual electoral accountability for issue stances is
most easily understood. Dyadic representation — the degree to which legislators’ policy positions
reflect their constituents’ policy preferences – is premised on a simple relationship between a legislator
and their constituency, understood as a single principal. Where district magnitude is greater than one,
it may not make sense to conceptualize the constituency as a single principal, but rather as multiple
principals defined by party identification, or possibly some other characteristic (Golder and Stramski
2010). Given the difficulties inherent in specifying these groups, testing the electoral accountability
of legislators for their issue stances becomes very difficult outside the set of countries which use
single-member districts, and in which we can talk of a one-to-one congruence relationship. Since rates
of legislative unity in these democracies (principally the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, France, and
India) are — with the exception of the US — generally high (Depauw and Martin 2009; Kam 2009,
p. 8), it is important to use occasions where there is within-party disagreement to test for the impact of
individual legislators’ stances, as we do here.
THE UNCONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF CONGRUENCE
The data for this analysis come from the 2014-2021 BES Internet Panel. There have been twenty waves
of the panel; the first wave took place in February-March 2014, and the most recent in June 2020. We
rely most heavily on data from waves seven (April-May 2016, before the referendum), and thirteen
(June 2017, after the general election). We also use pre-election waves eleven and twelve for data






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
on MPs’ pre-referendum issue stances (taken from the BBC), and information on the characteristics
of the different constituencies (taken from several different sources). The multiple waves of the BES
allow us to control for characteristics of respondents measured before their MP had adopted a position
on the referendum. Our analysis is restricted to participants in the post-election wave who said whether
and how they voted, and who could be associated with a constituency. We imputed missing survey data
using Amelia (Honaker et al. 2011).
The scope of our analysis is restricted to respondents from constituencies represented by a
Conservative or Labour incumbent who was in office at the start of the referendum campaign, and
who stood for re-election. We restrict our analysis to Conservative and Labour incumbents because
these are the only parties which were internally divided on Brexit, and for whom we can distinguish
between individual and party effects. We restrict our analysis to incumbents who were in office at the
start of the referendum campaign because it is not clear whether information on the issue stances of the
seven Labour or Conservative MPs who took office after the beginning of the campaign7 was widely
publicized. Finally, we restrict our analysis to MPs seeking re-election.8 We are left with information
from 25,189 respondents. Of these, 46% voted Leave in the referendum, 44% Remain, and 9% did not
vote.
The dependent variable in our analysis is whether the respondent voted for the incumbent. We
create two versions of this variable. One version has a value of one where the respondent voted for the
incumbent, and a value of zero in all other cases, including both cases where the respondent voted
for a challenger and cases where the respondent did not vote at all (mean = 0.45). The other version
excludes cases where the respondent did not vote (mean = 0.51). Because it is more closely connected
to the size of MPs’ majorities, we privilege estimates based on analyses excluding nonvoters, but our
substantive conclusions do not depend on which version of the dependent variable we use.
The independent variable in our analysis is whether the respondent’s MP adopted the same
position on Brexit as the respondent. This variable has a value of one where the respondent and MP
7Rosena Allin-Khan, Robert Courts, Sarah Caroline Johnson, Gareth Snell, Trudy Harrison, Tracy Brabin and
Gill Furniss.
8In table S12 we show that there is no significant association between congruence and retirement decisions when





































































































































both supported Leave or both supported Remain, and a value of zero in all other cases, including cases
where either the MP or the respondent adopted no position or did not vote (mean = 0.46).
The control variables in our analysis are of three kinds: control variables required because of the
nature of the independent variable; control variables required because of the potential for constituency
characteristics to confound a relationship between congruence and outcomes, and control variables
which it is desirable to include to increase the efficiency of our estimates and guard against the
possibility of non-random sample selection.
The first set of control variables includes controls for the incumbent’s referendum position and
the respondent’s referendum vote. These control variables are implied by how our key independent
variable is constructed. Because the value of congruence depends on the values of two other terms, it
functions like an interaction term. When models use interaction terms, it is necessary also to include
the constituent terms of the interaction: failure to include constituent terms usually leads to biased
estimates (Brambor et al. 2005). Bias might otherwise arise if Leave-supporting MPs generally did
better than Remain-supporting MPs, across all classes of voter, or if Leave-supporting respondents
were generally less likely to support incumbents, across all classes of incumbents.
The second set of control variables includes constituency-level variables which might affect both
the likelihood that the MP adopts a particular position and their vote share. The prior strength of UKIP
is just such a confound. MPs faced with a strong challenge from UKIP adopted more Euroskeptic
positions to deter future UKIP challenges and retain Euroskeptic voters (Heppell et al. 2017, 769).
Prior UKIP strength was also positively associated with changes in incumbent vote shares because the
party collapsed after the EU referendum had been won.
It is never possible to identify all such confounding variables. We base our selection of control
variables on work which has modeled aggregate level outcomes at the 2017 election (Heath and
Goodwin 2017, 355), work which has looked at the medium-term economic causes of Brexit (Colantone
and Stanig 2018), and general work on incumbents’ fortunes (Smith 2013; Martin 2016). From the
2011 census (following Heath and Goodwin (2017)) we take information on the proportion of the
constituency population aged 18-29; the proportion with a university degree; the proportion of ethnic






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
take information on exposure to Chinese import shocks, but remapped to Westminster constituencies.
We also include information on the incumbent’s tenure (one, two or more terms); whether the incumbent
was in the (shadow) cabinet; and the 2015 share of the vote for the Conservatives, Labour and UKIP.
Finally, we include pre-referendum estimates of constituency-level support for exiting the EU. These
estimates were produced using multilevel regression and post-stratification using opinion poll data
gathered between 2010 and 2014 (Hanretty et al. 2018).9
We do not include as constituency-level controls whether UKIP or The Green Party fielded
candidates in each seat. These decisions were made after incumbents had adopted their referendum
positions. These variables are therefore “post-treatment” variables: their inclusion in a regression
would mean that we would not — even in principle — be estimating the total causal effect of MPs’
issue positions on their vote share.
The third set of controls are controls for individuals’ characteristics. Strictly speaking, we do not
need to control for individual level measures to recover the causal effect of congruence, because there
is no causal pathway from “characteristics of particular respondents” to “MPs’ decisions”. However,
the inclusion of additional controls can increase the precision of our estimates, and allows for the
possibility that the sample is not a random sample of the population. For that reason, we include the
respondent’s propensity to vote (PTV) for the main UK-wide parties (Conservatives, Labour, Liberal
Democrats, UKIP, and The Green Party). These PTV variables were measured in the seventh BES
wave, completed before the referendum (fieldwork dates: April 12-May 4 2016). The PTV variables
offer a fine-grained characterization of the respondent’s political propensities.
To recover the effects of MPs’ stances, we estimate a multilevel logistic regression model using
different sets of these covariates. We use a multilevel model because respondents are clustered into
constituencies. We use a logistic regression model because our outcome is dichotomous. We use a
regression model rather than matching because even after coarsening (Iacus et al. 2012) the number
of matches is very much smaller than the number of units available for the regression, reducing the
efficiency of our estimates.
9We use pre-referendum campaign estimates rather than post-referendum estimates because the referendum





































































































































Formally, our model is as follows: the probability of individual 8 in constituency 9 voting for the
incumbent (H8 9 = 1) is a function of a global intercept (U), constituency-specific random intercepts
(` 9 ), MP position, respondent position, congruence, constituency covariates gathered in Xj, individual
covariates gathered in Zi, and an indicator variable which has value one if the incumbent was a Labour
incumbent. Specifically,
;>68C (%A (H8 9 = 1)) =U + ` 9+
V1 ·MP supported Remain 9+
V2 ·MP undeclared 9+
V3 · R supported Leave in 20168+
V4 · R did not vote in 20168+
V5 · R and MP congruent8 9+
^ j#6..28+
`i#29..51+
^ j#52..57 · Labour incumbent 9+
`i#58..63 · Labour incumbent 9+
^ j#64..86 · R supported Leave8+
`i#87..92 · R supported Leave8+
^ j#93..115 · R did not vote in 20168+
`i#116..121 · R did not vote in 20168
(1)
This specification allows for Labour incumbents to do better in certain types of constituencies
but not others, and among certain types of voters but not others. It also allows for the link between
respondent and constituency characteristics to vary according to 2016 referendum behavior. This is
necessary: the link between propensity to vote Conservative ought to be positive for Conservative































































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
FIGURE 3. AMEs from a model of unconditional issue accountability, with separate estimates
by voter type and seat type. Thin bars show 95% credible intervals; thick bars 90% credible
intervals. Estimates derive from tables S2 - S4.
Leave Remain All voters
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Model estimated on ... All repondents Voters only
By subsetting the data and removing interaction terms, the model can be estimated on Leave
or Remain voters only, or on respondents in Labour- or Conservative-held seats only, or on some
combination of the two. When subsetting to Remain voters, we report the effect of “MP supported
Remain”, rather than “R and MP congruent” (which we drop). When subsetting to Leave voters, we
use “MP supported Leave” instead of “MP supported Remain”. In all other cases, we report the effect
of “R and MP congruent”.
Given the large number of coefficients in each model and the difficulties of comparing logistic
regression coefficients estimated across different data subsets (Breen et al. 2018), we present average
marginal effects (AMEs) of the relevant variables. Figure 3 shows AMEs for different combinations of
incumbent party, voter type, and dependent variable. Estimates plotted with a circle show the results
from a model estimated on all respondents; estimates plotted with a triangle show the results from a
model estimated on 2017 voters only. The figure shows that the effects of congruence on the probability
that an individual respondent will vote for the incumbent range from 0.25 percentage points (the effect
of congruence on Remain-voting respondents in Conservative-held seats) to 6 percentage points (the
effect on Remain voters in Conservative-held seats). Our best estimate of a single, unconditional





































































































































These are individual effects. The aggregate consequences of these individual effects are necessarily
smaller, since any increases in aggregate vote share which result from changing an MP’s position
to match Leavers (for example) are partially cancelled out by losses among Remainers. The size of
the aggregate consequences will therefore depend on the imbalance in constituency opinion. If we
measure constituency-level congruence as the proportion of the constituency that supports the MP’s
position, then the standard deviation of this constituency-level measure is 11.3 percentage points. A
one-standard deviation increase in congruence would occur if a Remain- supporting MP switched to
Leave in a constituency where (50 + 11.3/2 =) 55.7% of citizens voted Leave. On the basis of a single
pooled congruence effect, then the aggregate consequences of such a switch would be around 0.56
percentage points (95% CI: 0.30, 0.83).10
Are effect sizes of 2.5 percentage points at the individual level or 0.56 percentage points at the
aggregate level large or small? We draw four comparisons. First, the effects are small relative to the
effects of other covariates: the coefficient on congruence is one-tenth the size of the coefficient on
propensity to vote. Second, the effects are small relative to benchmarks for the minimal important
distance: 0.56% is less than the the “fourth percentile of margin of victory” threshold used by Fortunato
and Monroe (2018) (2% in the case of the US House; 0.8 percent in the UK). Third, the effects are also
small relative to the effects of congruence in the US House on important issues: Nyhan et al. (2012)’s
estimates of the effects of voting against the (then generally unpopular) Affordable Care Act are thirteen
times larger. The effects are comparable to the effects of roll-call congruence in US state legislatures
given a similar one standard deviation shift (Rogers 2017). Finally, the aggregate consequences are
substantially smaller than the estimated effect of being implicated in the 2007 parliamentary expenses
10Let ! be the proportion of Leavers in a constituency, and ' the proportion of Remainers. Then, if 1 is the baseline
probability of supporting some candidate, and X is the change in probability associated with congruence, then the
vote share when the MP supports Leave (.!) is equal to.! = (1+X)!+ (1−X)', whereas the vote share if the MP
supports Remain (.') is equal to .' = (1 − X)! + (1 + X)'. The difference in vote share associated with a switch
from Remain to Leave is therefore (1 + X)! + (1 − X)' − (1 − X)! − (1 + X)', which simplifies to 2X! − 2X'.
If we substitute in values from the worked example above, where 55.7% of the MP’s constituents favoured Leave,
and she switched from Remain to Leave, then we can solve G = 2 · 0.025 · 0.557 − 2 · 0.025 · (1 − 0.557) to find






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
scandal (Eggers and Fisher 2011). This illustrates well the potential differences in the magnitudes
of valence effects (which operate on all voters) and congruence effects (which operate only on the
congruent).
THE CONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF CONGRUENCE
The previous section estimated the effect of the incumbent’s position on Brexit matching the respondent’s
own position on the probability of the respondent voting for an incumbent. The effect we estimated was
unconditional: whether the incumbent’s position was congruent was an equally strong reason for (not)
voting for the incumbent across all different contexts. There are, however, good reasons to think that the
effect of being out of step varies across different electoral contexts. In particular, voters may be more
likely to vote against an out of step incumbent if there is a relevant challenger who is more “in step”
than the incumbent. Remain voters may be more likely to vote against a Leave-supporting MP if there
is a relevant challenger who supports Remain, but not if the nearest challenger also supports Leave.
Hollibaugh et al. (2013) demonstrated this kind of conditional accountability in Congressional
elections. They argued that the best model of incumbent support is based not on the distance between
the respondent and the incumbent, but on how much closer the incumbent is to the respondent than
the challenger. This means that holding an incumbent to account can also involve selecting a better
replacement, and that the unconditional effects estimated in the previous section may underestimate the
effects of issue stances in certain types of contest.
To test conditional issue accountability, we collected information on the pre-referendum positions of
the parliamentary candidates selected by the second-placed party in 2015 (“challengers”). Challengers
were drawn from several different parties, but predominantly from Labour (198 candidates), the
Conservative Party (155) and UKIP (105).11 We began by examining candidates’ social media activity
prior to the referendum. Where candidates had made clear statements in favour of Leave or Remain, we
11Although UKIP were the best-placed challengers on the basis of the 2015 results, the party suffered a collapse in
support following the Brexit referendum. Absent constituency polling capable of indicating the second-placed
party prior to the 2017 election, we see no principled alternative to taking the positions of the UKIP candidates





































































































































FIGURE 4. AMEs from a model of conditional issue accountability, with separate estimates by
voter type and seat type. These estimates derive from table S5.
Leave Remain All voters
−3% 0% 3% 6% −3% 0% 3% 6% −3% 0% 3% 6%
Absent
Present
Average marginal effect of congruence






Model estimated on ... All repondents Voters only
coded their position accordingly. We contacted (by email) candidates who made no clear statement or
had no social media profile. We were able to identify referendum positions for 336 of 524 challengers.
Only in the Conservative party was there within-party variation, with a majority of Conservative
challengers (67 of 87 with identifiable positions) favoring Leave. All remaining parties’ challengers all
supported either Remaining (Labour, Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru) or
Leaving (UKIP).
Using the information on challenger positions we distinguish between two types of constituency
contests: contests where the challenger had a different position (the incumbent supported Leave and
the challenger Remain, or vice versa), and contests where the challenger and incumbent had the same
position.
We therefore re-estimate the model described in the previous section, adding an interaction between
the type of contest and the measure of congruence. Because this model has the character of a three-way
interaction (respondent position × incumbent position × type of contest), we once again eschew tables
of coefficients and present the AMEs of congruence evaluated in no-contrast and contrasting contests.
These are shown in Figure 4. As before, we give estimates from models estimated on Leave voters,
Remain voters, and all respondents, and according to whether the respondent voted in 2017.






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
are all very close to zero, and one has the wrong sign. The effects of congruence in contests where the
nearest challenger has a different position are larger, but are only significantly different from zero when
we pool together both Leave and Remain voters. In these models, the effect of congruence is around
four percent — regardless of whether we include non-voters in the sample — and is relatively precisely
estimated. This is more than one and a half times the size of the unconditional effect. At the aggregate
level, a standard deviation change in congruence would yield an increase in vote share of 0.95 [95% CI:
0.59 to 1.33].12
A model interacting congruence with the type of contest was suggested by theory and delivers very
different AMEs. This more complicated model also fits the data better: the value of the leave-one-out
criterion (LOOIC) is lower (better) for the conditional model than for the unconditional model (19,235.5
to 19,241.3, with a standard error on the difference of 3.4 units).
These results are not the result of other constituency characteristics associated with both contrasting
incumbent/challenger positions and the strength of incumbent sanctioning. Previous research has
argued that dyadic representation should be stronger in more educated areas and more marginal
seats (Lloren and Wüest 2016; Griffin 2006). Yet areas where the nearest challenger had a different
stance on Brexit tended to have lower levels of education (15.6% of the population have a university
degree, compared to 18.0% in seats without contrast), and higher majorities (average majority of 25.9
percentage points compared to 24.0 percentage points in non-contrasting races), which suggests that
these constituency characteristics cannot account for the stronger effect we see. Races where the nearest
challenger had a different position on Brexit did have higher UKIP performance in the past (average
vote share of 14.9 percentage points compared to 13.4), but we do not see this as a rival interpretation:
UKIP provided some of the contrast we see.
Using these conditional effects, we can work out the implications of congruence for the 2017
election. Thirty-seven of the 524 MPs considered here lost their seat in the election. Of these, sixteen
were also out of step with their constituency. Seven of these sixteen MPs, because they faced a
challenger who had a contrasting position, could reliably have improved their vote share by switching.
In four cases, the increase in vote share might plausibly have exceeded the challenger’s margin of victory.





































































































































In Kensington (69% Remain), Victoria Borwick would have gained just over three percentage points by
switching from Leave to Remain — greater than the very small majority her Labour challenger won
(0.05%). In Canterbury (55% Remain), Julian Brazier would have won 0.8 percentage points, again
greater than the majority of his Labour challenger (0.33%). Had these two Conservative MPs switched,
the Conservative party would still have lost its majority, but would have been less reliant on legislative
support from the Democratic Unionist Party. Conversely, two Labour MPs could have retained their
seats had they switched. Rob Flello, MP for Stoke-on-Trent South (71% Leave) could have secured
3.5 percentage points more by switching, exceeding his (Conservative) opponent’s majority of 1.6
percentage points. Alan Meale (Mansfield, 71% Leave) could also have beaten Conservative candidate
Ben Bradley with a similarly sized swing.
OBJECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
In presenting earlier versions of this work, we encountered two objections, both of which concern
the causal pathway between MPs’ stances and respondents’ votes. The first objection runs as follows:
for MPs to be held accountable, voters have to know how MPs campaigned during the referendum.
However, past research has shown that only a small minority of people know the name of their own MP
(Hansard Society 2013; cf. Cowley 2014). It is therefore implausible that any incumbent sanctioning
should exist given widespread ignorance.
We respond to this objection by showing that there was an association between MPs’ stances and
survey respondents’ perceptions of their MP’s stance. Waves eleven and twelve of the BES (pre-election
waves fielded between April and June 2017) asked respondents about their perceptions of their local
MP’s stance on Brexit, on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means the MP “strongly opposes” Brexit and 5
means the MP “strongly supports” Brexit (mean of 3.14; SD = 1.3). We model respondent perceptions
using the same formula as in equation (1),13 except that we drop the “R and MP congruent” term. For
ease of interpretation, we use a multilevel linear model, despite the discrete character of the responses.
Because our model is a linear model, we plot model coefficients rather than AMEs. We focus on
the effects of MP position (our key independent variable) as well as two important control variables:






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
FIGURE 5. Selected coefficients from a model of perceptions of MPs’ Brexit stances. Nega-
tive coefficients indicate greater perceived opposition to Brexit. Full regression models are
reported in Table S6
All seats Cons.−held seats Labour−held seats
−0.5 0.0 0.5 −0.5 0.0 0.5 −0.5 0.0 0.5
R voted Leave in 2016
R did not vote in 2016
Labour incumbent





the incumbent’s party (since respondents may project party positions onto MPs) and the respondent’s
own position (since respondents may project their own position on to incumbents: Wilson and Gronke
(2000)). The values of these coefficients are shown in Figure 5 for models estimated separately on
respondents in Conservative-held seats, Labour-held seats, and all seats.
The strongest association with perceived Brexit stance is party: Labour incumbents are perceived
as much more hostile to Brexit than Conservative incumbents (the reference category). However, this
association is only very slightly stronger than the association with MPs’ actual issue stance. On a
1-5 scale, MPs who campaigned for Remain are 0.6 points (0.48 standard deviations) more hostile to
Brexit. MPs who adopted no position are more likely to be perceived as hostile to Brexit than MPs
who campaigned for Leave. Surprisingly, voters do not project their own views onto their incumbent.
The fact that there is a substantively meaningful and statistically significant association between





































































































































in some absolute sense, about MPs’ positions. Just over half of respondents (52%) gave the correct
answer (scores of 4 or 5 for MPs who had campaigned for Leave; scores of 1 or 2 for MPs who had
campaigned for Remain; scores of 3 for MPs who were undeclared). These findings do, however, allow
us to show that the incumbent sanctioning we have identified can operate through changed perceptions
on the part of voters. When we model incumbent voting using perceived congruence rather than actual
congruence, we obtain standardized effect sizes that are twice as large (tables S7 - S9; figure S1). Had
voters had perfect knowledge of MPs’ positions, issue accountability would have been greater.
The second common objection is, in some ways, the opposite of the first, since it is premised on
voters knowing about MPs’ positions on the issue of Europe not only currently, but also in previous
elections. It runs as follows: our regression models do not recover the causal effects of MPs choosing
a position in the referendum, since some MPs (like John Redwood, Bill Cash or Andrew Rosindell)
were always going to campaign to leave the EU. It is reasonable to believe voters had already taken
these pre-existing positions into account. By failing to control for prior Euroskepticism, our models
underestimate the effects of positions on Brexit specifically.
We are able to respond to this objection by using a measure of prior Euroskepticism for a limited
set of Conservative MPs. Heppell (2013) assigned all Conservative MPs in the 2010-15 parliament to
one of four categories in relation to Europe. Of the 238 MPs who sat in the 2010-15 parliament and are
also considered here, five were described as “europhile”; 51 as “agnostic”, 130 as “soft euroskeptic”,
and 66 as “hard euroskeptic”.
Because these ratings are only available for a subset of Conservative MPs, using them in models
of incumbent voting or perceptions of MP stance results in a decrease in sample size. We estimated
models of incumbent voting on all 11,857 respondents in seats held by Conservatives for whom Heppell
(2013) had assigned a rating, both including and omitting these ratings. We interacted these ratings with
the respondent’s own vote in the referendum. The inclusion of these additional terms does not change
the effect of of congruence: the posterior probability that congruence is smaller in the model with
ratings is just 58% (see Table S10). Nor are perceptions of MPs’ attitudes toward Brexit significantly
associated with these ratings (Table S11). Our conclusions are therefore unchanged by the inclusion of






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
MPS’ PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ISSUE
STANCES
Scholars of representation understand that legislators’ actions must be explained with reference to
legislators’ beliefs and preferences, and that legislators’ beliefs can be more or less accurate (Miller and
Stokes 1963, 50-51; Mansbridge 2003, 517). We have shown that constituents don’t (meaningfully)
sanction legislators with noncongruent issue positions, but do MPs know this? If MPs instead believe
that constituents respond to their issue positions by sanctioning, then there are still perceived incentives
for MPs to act in line with constituency preferences. Those incentives might be fragile, and the belief in
meaningful accountability for issue stances would be a sort of noble myth, but we would nonetheless be
able to explain observed levels of dyadic representation (Hanretty et al. 2017) by referring to legislators’
beliefs about constituency opinion and their preference for re-election.
We therefore surveyed MPs to elicit beliefs about the electoral penalty of being out of step with
one’s constituents. Specifically, we presented MPs with a series of six vignettes which gave details on
an incumbent MP, their position in the referendum campaign (Leave or Remain), the position of their
principal challenger, and asked MPs to estimate the vote share the incumbent would have won if they
had campaigned for Remain instead of Leave (or vice versa). We supplied MPs with information on
the incumbent’s actual vote share in the 2017 election, and estimates of Leave/Remain support in each
incumbent’s constituency. One of the vignettes used is shown in Box 1; the full survey wording is
reported in the Appendix.
Box 1: An estimated 62% of voters in Reading East voted to Remain in the 2016 referendum.
The sitting MP, Rob Wilson (Con.), campaigned for Remain in that referendum.
His main opponent, Matt Rodda (Lab.), supported Remain.
In the 2017 general election, Wilson won over 23,000 votes, or 42.3%, compared to Rodda who won
49%.
Now suppose that Wilson had campaigned for Leave instead.
How many votes would Wilson have won had he switched to support Leave? Please give your answer
as a percentage.





































































































































derived from regression models of voter behaviour. For this we need precise quantitative estimates
rather than vague quantifiers ("a great deal", "somewhat", etc.,). Vignettes, because they present survey
respondents with precise, relevant factual stimuli, make these precise estimates possible. We asked
MPs for their views on other MPs’ electoral fortunes (rather than their own) in order to minimize any
potential spotlight effect which might cause MPs to over-estimate the salience of their own actions to
voters, but it is still possible that MPs as a group over-estimate the salience of individual politicians’
stances. We also presented MPs with even numbers of Leave- and Remain-supporting incumbents.
Within these groups, we selected incumbents who had high, average and low values of congruence (high
= 62% of constituents supported the incumbent’s position; average = 50% of constituents supported the
incumbent’s position; low = 38% of constituents supported the incumbent’s position). We additionally
selected only incumbents who faced challengers with a contrasting position on Brexit, since these
contests represent the most favourable case for an accountability effect.
The survey was fielded between February 3 and March 25 2019 by Savanta ComRes, an opinion
research firm who conduct regular panel studies of MPs’ opinions, and who fielded our questions
alongside other questions in an omnibus survey. A total of 111 MPs participated in the survey.
Opposition MPs were over-represented in the sample, so we weight responses to reflect the partisan
composition of the House of Commons after the 2019 general election. Because of the need to
preserve respondent anonymity, the individual-level responses include information on MPs’ referendum
position and party only,14 except that for some MPs their referendum position was unclear or unknown
(principally because they entered parliament after the 2017 or 2019 elections). Upon inspecting the
data, we found that some MPs seemed to have misunderstood the question format. Although MPs were
asked to give the share of the vote the incumbent would have won had they switched, a number of
MPs gave uniformly low answers (less than 10 percentage points), which suggests they understood
the question to be asking about the additional share of the vote the incumbent would have won. We
exclude from our analysis respondents who gave blank responses or who only gave figures lower than
or equal to ten percentage points, no matter the scenario. We are left with 576 responses from 96
14 We supplied Savanta ComRes with a list of MPs and positions, and Savanta ComRes merged this data with the
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Vignette switch Leave−>Remain Remain−>Leave
Respondent position Leave Remain Unknown
respondent MPs.
Figure 6 shows estimates of the change in vote share (politicians’ estimates minus the incumbent’s
actual vote share in 2017) as a function of the degree of congruence following the switch implied by
the vignette. Points are plotted using different colours to show Leave-to-Remain and Remain-to-Leave
switchers separately, and using different shapes to show estimates from respondent MPs who originally
supported Leave, Remain, or who had no clear position. Most estimates of change (four in every seven
responses) are between -5 percentage points and +3 percentage points. The dashed grey line shows a





































































































































Figure 6 provides a first indication that MPs do not expect that fellow MPs win substantially more
votes by switching positions to become more congruent. On its own, however, the figure is not sufficient.
In order to recover a figure which matches, as closely as possible, the estimates from our analysis
of voter behaviour, we model MPs’ estimates of counterfactual vote share using a multilevel linear
regression. The parameters in the model are: an intercept, a dummy variable which has a value of
one if the incumbent’s previous position was to support Remain, and the value of congruence. These
additional parameters have a substantive interpretation. The intercept allows for MPs to judge that
incumbents in our vignettes generally do better or worse by switching. A negative intercept (which
is suggested by figure 6) would indicate that MPs generally think incumbents do worse by switching
position, regardless of whether this switch improves congruence. The dummy variable measuring the
candidate’s original position allows for certain switches to be regarded as generally positive or negative.
A positive coefficient on this variable would, for example, indicate that switching to support Leave is
regarded as electorally beneficial (perhaps because it signals independent-mindedness: Campbell et al.
(2019)). The lagged vote share variable accounts for an obvious determinant of election outcomes
(even hypothetical ones), and is better than directly modelling changes, for reasons set out by Tennant
et al. (2019). We also include in our model respondent-specific random intercepts which allow for
more generous and/or more variable respondent MPs.
TABLE 1. Multilevel regression




Original share 0.770 (0.085)∗∗∗
Congruence 0.140 (0.052)∗∗





Num. groups: uuid 96































































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
The resulting regression model is shown in Table 1. Although our best estimate for the intercept is
negative, indicating that switching of any kind brings electoral costs, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero. The coefficient on "original position Remain" is positive, indicating that MPs
thought that switches to support Leave would generally have been vote-winning, independently of
whether they took place in a Leave-supporting or a Remain-supporting constituency. The influence
of past vote share is statistically and substantively significant. Our focus, however, is on the effect of
congruence. The coefficient reports the effect of a single unit increase, and so the effect of a standard
deviation increase is roughly eleven times larger, at 1.5 percentage points (95% CI: 0.4 to 2.66 points).
This figure is consistent with, but slightly larger than, the aggregate implications of our conditional
issue sanctioning model (as above, 0.95 percentage points [95% CI: 0.53 to 1.38 percentage points]).
Although effects at the upper end of this range (above two percentage points) would be regarded as
substantively significant, our overall conclusion, bearing in mind the central estimate and the fact that
we showed MPs the most favourable contests for issue accountability, is that MPs do, on average,
believe that their accountability for issue stances is minimal.
Our claim throughout has been that the coefficient on congruence in our model of MPs’ judgements
can be compared with our estimates of the effects of congruence from our models of voter behaviour.
This claim is less tenable the more MPs engage in expressive survey responses (Berinsky 2018) by
estimating large vote shares for incumbents who switch to their preferred position, carry out survey
satisficing (Krosnick 1999) by giving estimates of zero, one hundred, or “no change” responses, or
incorporate additional vignette-specific contextual information not included in our individual level
analysis. In supplementary analysis, we describe a set of additional models which exclude prima facie
expressive or survey-satisficing responses, and which drop one vignette at a time. When expressive or
survey-satisficing responses are excluded, the coefficient on congruence is smaller, but never smaller
than 0.1, or 70% of the value reported in Table 1. When individual vignettes are dropped, the coefficient
on congruence varies, but the differences between the baseline model and the leave-one-out models are
never statistically significant. We encourage researchers who intend to elicit politicians’ estimates of
electoral accountability to consider these robustness checks when carrying out their analyses, and to





































































































































particular case, MPs responses are consistent with the results of our analysis of voter behaviour, but
that does not absolve researchers of the need to check for particular biases and processes common to
all survey respondents.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we assessed the electoral benefit to incumbents of being in step with their constituents.
To do this we estimated the effects on individual voters in the 2017 UK general election of having an
MP who shared the respondent’s position on the UK’s exit from the EU. Averaging across all voters,
we found that voters were 2.5 percentage points more likely to vote for an incumbent who shared
their position on Brexit. In seats where the incumbent and the principal challenger held different
positions on Brexit, this effect was greater: four percentage points. The aggregate consequences of
these individual-level findings are smaller in magnitude, because gains amongst Brexit-supporting
voters are offset by losses among Brexit opponents. We estimate that a standard deviation increase in
congruence — understood as the percentage of constituents who share the incumbent’s position — is
associated with an increase in vote share of 0.6 percentage points, and that four of 632 seats might have
changed parties, had incumbents adopted the vote-maximizing issue stance. In a follow-up study of
MPs, we showed that MPs’ estimates of the benefits on being in step are similar to the estimates we
have presented here. On this basis, we conclude that MPs are not held accountable for their individual
issue stances to any substantially meaningful degree.
We have made two distinctive contributions which we highlight here. The first is a methodological
contribution: we have shown how vignettes can be used to elicit politicians’ estimates of issue
accountability, estimates which, in our particular context, were comparable in sign and magnitude to
estimates based on the analysis of voter behaviour. Vignettes and models of voter behaviour needn’t
produce comparable estimates – politicians may have mistaken beliefs about electoral accountability
– but our findings show that legislators as a group are not subject to a “spotlight effect” (Gilovich
et al. 2000) which leads them to overstate the importance of their own policy stances. Vignettes and
models of voter behaviour are complements, rather than substitutes, and the two can be fruitfully






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
of voter behaviour, researchers can improve issue accountability (assuming this to be a good thing)
by publicising their findings about voter behaviour. Where instead politicians over-estimate issue
accountability, researchers may instead combat a “noble myth” of highly-responsive policy-aware
voters.
Our second contribution lies in confirming challenger position as an important mechanism of
electoral issue accountability. Incumbents are only penalized for being out of step on an issue when
their principal challenger has a different position on that issue. We are not the first to make this
argument (Hollibaugh et al. 2013), but we are the first to show this using candidates’ actual issue
positions rather than survey respondents’ perceptions of candidates. In this respect we are aided by
British electoral geography and the multiparty system, which means that candidates from the same
party can face challengers with very different positions on Brexit. This finding has relevance across all
systems which use single member plurality, including studies of Congressional elections in the United
States.
We have made claims about voter behavior in a particular British election. To what extent do our
findings generalize across time and space? We argue that our findings represent an upper bound on the
degree of individual accountability for issue positions found in British politics, and that they are likely
to generalize to other party-centered systems which use single-member districts. We argue that this
is an upper bound on similar effects for the British case because Brexit is — in absolute terms — a
very important issue in British politics; because Brexit is — in relative terms — a more important
issue than other issues which have prompted within-party division such as fox-hunting or abortion, and
because we hold the auxiliary belief that accountability is likely to be greater on more important issues
than less important issues. Our findings thus generalize across time within one country.
We also argue that our findings are likely to generalize across space to other countries which use
single-member districts, though the degree to which they generalize will be context-specific. (We speak
only to systems which use single-member districts because only these systems have the same one-to-one
representative link). Suppose that the incentive to be in step with one’s constituents on a particular
issue depends on the general system-level incentive to cultivate a personal vote, and on the importance





































































































































set out in Carey and Shugart (1995). We can claim that individual issue accountability for issues with
similar or lesser importance than Brexit will be either similar or weaker for other countries which, like
the UK, use single-member plurality with party endorsements (Carey and Shugart’s category (a)) — a
category which includes India, Canada, and much of East Africa and the Caribbean.
For countries which have — in Carey and Shugart’s (1995) typology — stronger incentives to
cultivate a personal vote, our ability to generalize will depend on the relative contribution of issue
importance and system-level incentives. If issue importance affects issue accountability much more
than the system-level incentives, then our decision to study an extremely important issue in Brexit
may allow us to make claims about issue accountability for issues of average importance in other
countries with stronger system-level incentives. There are good reasons to think that issue importance
matters greatly (Bovitz and Carson 2006; Highton 2019). We therefore argue that our findings provide
information about the degree of accountability for issue positions, on issues of average importance,
in other countries with stronger system-level incentives. For example: Carey and Shugart judge that
France (because of the two-round system) and Australia (because of the alternative vote) have higher
system-level incentives to cultivate a personal vote than the UK. We would argue that Brexit is more
important to the UK political system than the average issue in French and Australian politics, and that
it is therefore reasonable to believe that issue accountability for the average issue in those countries is
equal to, or less than, the issue accountability effects we show here.
Our study has normative implications for electoral system choice. Specifically, we believe our
findings make single-member plurality less attractive, because it does not generate within-party
incentives for one-to-one congruence between the median voter within a constituency and the
representative of that constituency. Within-party congruence still occurs (Hanretty et al. 2017), but it
presumably occurs thanks to other mechanisms such as intrinsic motivation or selection. Within-party
congruence is, we argue, an important part of the defense of single member plurality — or put slightly
differently, we do not think defenders of single member plurality systems would be comfortable with the
prospect that a Conservative MP in central London or Toronto faces the same set of policy incentives
as a Conservative MP in East Anglia or Alberta. Although single-member plurality systems can be






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
strong reasons for legislators to follow their constituency’s policy preferences.
SOFTWARE STATEMENT
The multilevel models shown in the article were estimated using the brms package (Bürkner 2017) for
the R statistical environment (R Core Team 2019). Figures were created using ggplot2 (Wickham
2016).
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MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ARE MINIMALLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR
ISSUE STANCES (AND THEY KNOW IT) – APPENDIX
This appendix includes several analyses referenced in the main text, together with additional information
relating to our handling of data.
• Table S1 provides summary statistics for our voter data;
• Tables S2 - S4 report coefficient values for the logistic regression models visualized, in the
main body of the text, as Figure 3 (unconditional effects of congruence). The models in these
tables are estimated on voters in Conservative-held seats, voters in Labour-held seats, and all
voters respectively.
• Table S5 reports coefficient values for the logistic regression models visualized, in the main
body of the text, as Figure 4 (conditional effects of congruence).
• Table S6 reports regressions of perceptions of MPs’ stances of Brexit, visualized in the main
body of the text as Figure 5
• Tables S7 - S9 report coefficient values for additional logistic regression models which replace
actual congruence with perceived congruence, an analysis referenced in the text in the section
“Objections and limitations”.
• Table S10 report coefficient values for regression models of incumbent voting for a subset of
Conservative-held seats where we have pre-2014 measures of the incumbent’s stance on Europe.
This analysis is referenced in the text in the section “Objections and limitations”.
• Table S12 reports a logistic regression where the outcome variable is whether or not the
incumbent MP elected in the 2015 election stood down before the 2017 election. This analysis
is referenced in footnote 8.
• Tables S13 and S14 provide further analysis of our MP data, respectively removing certain
types of responses and specific vignettes.
Note that continuous variables in the data have been standardized to have zero mean and unit
standard deviation; the coefficient values therefore represent the effects of a one standard deviation









































































































































TABLE S1. Summary statistics
var Min Max Mean SD Missing
Import shock 0.06 0.75 0.33 0.13 0.01
(Shadow) cabinet member 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00
R voted for incumbent 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 0.00
Congruence 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 0.00
Incumbent is Cons 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.48 0.00
Incumbent supported Leave 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 0.00
Incumbent undeclared 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.14 0.00
Two-term incumbent 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49 0.00
Three-term incumbent or more 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.48 0.00
Lab PTV -1.08 1.46 0.01 1.01 0.47
Cons PTV -0.96 1.51 0.04 1.00 0.47
UKIP PTV -0.80 1.83 0.06 1.02 0.46
Green PTV -0.91 2.20 -0.03 0.99 0.47
LibDem PTV -0.95 2.23 0.01 1.00 0.47
Perceived MP Brexit stance 1.00 5.00 3.16 1.25 0.35
Census: % unemployed 2.10 9.53 4.22 1.31 0.00
Sample weight 0.06 19.71 1.04 0.94 0.00
Census: % aged 18 to 24 5.73 32.68 9.30 3.73 0.00
UKIP share in 2015 1.22 33.79 14.17 5.37 0.00
LibDem share in 2015 1.26 38.18 7.85 7.67 0.00
Census: % w/ L4+ qualifications 12.07 57.39 27.04 8.07 0.00
Cons share in 2015 6.60 65.88 40.06 14.25 0.00
Leave support in 2014 18.96 71.94 51.74 9.04 0.00
Census: % nonwhite 1.02 76.91 11.71 14.22 0.00











TABLE S2. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Conservative seats only. Models with (*)
are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election.
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
(Intercept) -2.097 (0.21) -1.131 (0.223) -1.015 (0.172) -0.104 (0.172) -1.332 (0.199) -1.006 (0.208)
Conservative share 2015 0.559 (0.206) 0.741 (0.214) 0.433 (0.155) 0.593 (0.161) 0.529 (0.192) 0.575 (0.201)
Labour share 2015 0.289 (0.16) 0.427 (0.168) -0.009 (0.117) 0.114 (0.121) 0.434 (0.141) 0.486 (0.155)
UKIP share 2015 0.114 (0.116) 0.141 (0.131) -0.149 (0.081) -0.14 (0.083) 0.144 (0.106) 0.129 (0.116)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011
census -0.016 (0.12) -0.007 (0.117) -0.035 (0.087) -0.037 (0.093) -0.079 (0.107) -0.062 (0.112)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications
of greater, 2011 census -0.067 (0.243) -0.109 (0.267) -0.364 (0.181) -0.395 (0.189) -0.102 (0.243) -0.099 (0.244)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census 0.028 (0.166) 0.142 (0.185) 0.023 (0.139) -0.049 (0.143) 0.058 (0.163) 0.129 (0.17)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011
census -0.038 (0.161) -0.111 (0.172) -0.128 (0.141) -0.167 (0.146) -0.061 (0.151) -0.15 (0.159)
Import shock 0.107 (0.071) 0.045 (0.076) -0.052 (0.053) -0.077 (0.054) 0.098 (0.07) 0.086 (0.075)
Incumbent has served two
terms -0.107 (0.145) -0.199 (0.158) -0.051 (0.11) -0.102 (0.112) -0.276 (0.142) -0.338 (0.15)
Incumbent has served three
or more terms -0.19 (0.144) -0.219 (0.159) -0.257 (0.117) -0.268 (0.124) -0.158 (0.142) -0.216 (0.151)
Incumbent is (shadow)
cabinet member -0.076 (0.188) -0.059 (0.206) 0.016 (0.156) -0.09 (0.157) -0.088 (0.197) -0.027 (0.199)
Constituency support for
Brexit in 2014 -0.151 (0.217) -0.043 (0.254) -0.174 (0.166) -0.235 (0.167) -0.174 (0.226) -0.038 (0.236)
East of England 0.021 (0.228) -0.145 (0.238) 0.094 (0.165) 0.086 (0.165) -0.07 (0.215) -0.151 (0.223)
London 0.316 (0.329) 0.033 (0.354) -0.037 (0.262) -0.076 (0.27) 0.136 (0.305) 0.056 (0.326)
North East 0.068 (0.497) -0.174 (0.508) -0.074 (0.415) -0.4 (0.423) -0.053 (0.436) -0.191 (0.439)
North West 0.215 (0.245) 0.225 (0.256) -0.084 (0.204) -0.023 (0.203) 0.231 (0.236) 0.276 (0.245)
Scotland 1.456 (0.703) 1.401 (0.719) 0.276 (0.614) 0.351 (0.631) 1.036 (0.608) 1.076 (0.617)
South East 0.012 (0.213) -0.035 (0.222) -0.159 (0.171) 0.033 (0.168) 0.045 (0.19) -0.007 (0.205)
South West 0.508 (0.219) 0.338 (0.233) 0.112 (0.177) 0.036 (0.169) 0.382 (0.209) 0.346 (0.212)
Wales 0.2 (0.348) 0.152 (0.386) 0.031 (0.281) 0.01 (0.275) 0.155 (0.335) 0.09 (0.348)
West Midlands 0.339 (0.261) 0.182 (0.244) 0.173 (0.191) 0.123 (0.18) 0.238 (0.21) 0.167 (0.214)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.286 (0.263) 0.112 (0.27) -0.184 (0.215) -0.167 (0.223) 0.098 (0.245) 0.029 (0.245)
R propensity to vote Cons. 1.878 (0.068) 1.718 (0.08) 1.461 (0.064) 1.43 (0.067) 1.761 (0.069) 1.75 (0.071)







TABLE S2. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Conservative seats only. Models with (*)
are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Labour -0.599 (0.068) -0.953 (0.066) -0.498 (0.046) -0.807 (0.058) -0.715 (0.065) -0.864 (0.072)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.195 (0.05) -0.39 (0.05) -0.206 (0.057) -0.207 (0.056) -0.317 (0.055) -0.381 (0.053)
R propensity to vote UKIP 0.368 (0.068) 0.608 (0.081) 0.691 (0.053) 0.369 (0.056) 0.494 (0.076) 0.556 (0.084)
R propensity to vote Green -0.413 (0.071) -0.453 (0.06) -0.404 (0.053) -0.343 (0.051) -0.407 (0.063) -0.445 (0.063)
Incumbent campaigned to
Remain in 2016 -0.011 (0.102) 0.073 (0.113) -0.071 (0.085) -0.091 (0.085) -0.018 (0.068) -0.026 (0.072)
Incumbent undeclared in
2016 0.104 (0.33) 0.729 (0.354) -0.154 (0.245) 0.114 (0.269) 0.178 (0.21) 0.381 (0.241)
sd__(Intercept) 0.519 (0.058) 0.457 (0.084) 0.451 (0.045) 0.276 (0.08) 0.331 (0.045) 0.272 (0.054)
R did not vote in 2016 -1.919 (0.311) -0.796 (0.417)
R voted Leave in 2016 1.132 (0.218) 1.166 (0.232)
Congruence 0.052 (0.062) 0.109 (0.067)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 0.214 (0.334) 0.905 (0.481)
Cons. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.114 (0.219) -0.172 (0.242)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.48 (0.271) -0.486 (0.43)
Lab. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.437 (0.158) -0.388 (0.177)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 0.072 (0.209) 0.055 (0.265)
UKIP share in 2015 by R











TABLE S2. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Conservative seats only. Models with (*)
are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not
vote in 2016 0.211 (0.202) 0.369 (0.289)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.015 (0.119) -0.022 (0.136)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.034 (0.366) 0.041 (0.493)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.422 (0.28) -0.314 (0.294)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not
vote in 2016 0.108 (0.296) 0.181 (0.403)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.026 (0.193) -0.207 (0.216)
Pct. unemployed by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.03 (0.324) 0.241 (0.447)
Pct. unemployed by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.142 (0.182) -0.079 (0.205)
Import shock by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.018 (0.116) -0.167 (0.165)
Import shock by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.224 (0.076) -0.167 (0.083)
Two-term incumbent by R did
not vote in 2016 0.623 (0.234) 0.812 (0.327)
Three+ term incumbent by R
did not vote in 2016 -0.008 (0.255) 0.049 (0.343)
Two-term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.139 (0.161) 0.163 (0.178)
Three+ term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.096 (0.166) -0.047 (0.183)
Cabinet member by R did not
vote in 2016 0.115 (0.42) -0.173 (0.415)
Cabinet member by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.045 (0.219) 0.006 (0.238)







TABLE S2. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Conservative seats only. Models with (*)
are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
2014 support for Brexit by R
did not vote in 2016 -0.014 (0.354) 0.018 (0.475)
2014 support for Brexit by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.128 (0.253) -0.252 (0.274)
East of England by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.017 (0.328) 0.122 (0.437)
London by R did not vote in
2016 0.345 (0.476) -0.307 (0.571)
North East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.166 (0.745) -0.417 (0.79)
North West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.06 (0.423) -0.097 (0.516)
Scotland by R did not vote in
2016 0.05 (0.934) 0.237 (0.999)
South East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.462 (0.33) -0.088 (0.432)
South West by R did not vote
in 2016 0.191 (0.39) -0.138 (0.45)
Wales by R did not vote in
2016 -0.069 (0.584) 0.08 (0.755)
West Midlands by R did not
vote in 2016 0.353 (0.383) -0.143 (0.495)
Yorks. by R did not vote in
2016 0.064 (0.444) 0.557 (0.55)
East of England by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.112 (0.234) 0.248 (0.245)
London by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.401 (0.352) -0.071 (0.392)
North East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.272 (0.517) -0.219 (0.549)
North West by R voted Leave











TABLE S2. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Conservative seats only. Models with (*)
are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Scotland by R voted Leave in
2016 -1.183 (0.664) -0.887 (0.707)
South East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.203 (0.212) 0.048 (0.232)
South West by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.512 (0.223) -0.361 (0.247)
Wales by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.264 (0.378) -0.209 (0.398)
West Midlands by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.131 (0.233) 0.003 (0.252)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.585 (0.273) -0.322 (0.297)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.272 (0.179) -0.136 (0.222)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.37 (0.086) -0.325 (0.086)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in
2016 0.285 (0.213) -0.369 (0.225)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.181 (0.087) 0.102 (0.105)
PTV LibDem by R did not
vote in 2016 0.089 (0.19) 0.03 (0.185)
PTV LibDem by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.123 (0.07) 0.188 (0.081)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote
in 2016 0.128 (0.143) 0.262 (0.218)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.177 (0.088) -0.324 (0.093)
PTV Green by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.114 (0.197) 0.006 (0.224)
PTV Green by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.105 (0.101) 0.12 (0.08)







TABLE S2. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Conservative seats only. Models with (*)
are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Number of obs. 7941 7017 8997 7830 15819 14351
Number of groups 315 315 315 315 315 315











TABLE S3. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Labour seats only. Models with (*) are
estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election.
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
(Intercept) -0.962 (0.392) 0.42 (0.43) -1.202 (0.406) -0.214 (0.455) -0.25 (0.388) 0.132 (0.43)
Conservative share 2015 0.177 (0.185) 0.482 (0.209) -0.057 (0.213) 0.023 (0.253) 0.319 (0.184) 0.506 (0.199)
Labour share 2015 0.417 (0.219) 0.607 (0.253) 0.363 (0.237) 0.419 (0.27) 0.312 (0.239) 0.507 (0.25)
UKIP share 2015 -0.09 (0.121) 0.166 (0.145) -0.109 (0.127) 0.057 (0.148) 0.163 (0.134) 0.186 (0.145)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011
census 0.061 (0.075) 0.031 (0.083) 0.087 (0.081) 0.017 (0.094) -0.006 (0.077) 0.021 (0.085)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications
of greater, 2011 census 0.13 (0.258) -0.084 (0.304) 0.136 (0.273) 0.121 (0.326) -0.178 (0.262) -0.216 (0.294)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census -0.12 (0.108) 0.07 (0.127) -0.226 (0.111) -0.048 (0.133) 0.064 (0.111) 0.052 (0.126)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011
census -0.044 (0.12) -0.138 (0.135) -0.018 (0.12) -0.028 (0.14) -0.089 (0.129) -0.138 (0.14)
Import shock 0.067 (0.068) 0.085 (0.08) 0.074 (0.074) 0.073 (0.088) 0.058 (0.072) 0.027 (0.08)
Incumbent has served two
terms -0.351 (0.19) -0.473 (0.212) -0.137 (0.197) -0.13 (0.232) -0.497 (0.189) -0.501 (0.211)
Incumbent has served three
or more terms -0.227 (0.168) -0.36 (0.192) -0.022 (0.18) -0.032 (0.207) -0.215 (0.175) -0.267 (0.189)
Incumbent is (shadow)
cabinet member -0.223 (0.194) -0.259 (0.217) -0.241 (0.198) -0.178 (0.24) -0.16 (0.205) -0.317 (0.223)
Constituency support for
Brexit in 2014 0.134 (0.247) -0.126 (0.296) 0.213 (0.258) 0.055 (0.299) -0.209 (0.256) -0.171 (0.283)
East of England -0.37 (0.458) -0.475 (0.466) 0.101 (0.452) 0.137 (0.506) -0.376 (0.419) -0.348 (0.44)
London 0.113 (0.348) -0.026 (0.368) 0.345 (0.361) 0.044 (0.408) 0.035 (0.352) 0.126 (0.357)
North East 0.02 (0.325) 0.181 (0.341) -0.303 (0.31) -0.077 (0.334) 0.176 (0.307) 0.142 (0.324)
North West 0.009 (0.271) 0.25 (0.281) -0.161 (0.267) -0.014 (0.287) 0.123 (0.267) 0.281 (0.277)
Scotland -0.147 (0.645) 0.184 (0.643) -0.113 (0.703) 0.438 (0.766) 0.411 (0.606) 0.444 (0.63)
South East 0.333 (0.559) -0.068 (0.559) -0.597 (0.605) -0.903 (0.684) 0.397 (0.512) 0.013 (0.533)
South West 0.269 (0.45) 0.436 (0.458) -0.572 (0.502) -0.311 (0.585) 0.374 (0.415) 0.437 (0.44)
Wales 0.185 (0.308) 0.002 (0.32) -0.126 (0.318) -0.214 (0.353) -0.091 (0.299) -0.08 (0.325)
West Midlands 0.006 (0.307) 0.014 (0.321) -0.008 (0.312) -0.032 (0.349) 0.046 (0.306) 0.112 (0.318)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.125 (0.276) 0.023 (0.292) 0.085 (0.287) 0.123 (0.306) 0.114 (0.272) 0.099 (0.285)
R propensity to vote Cons. -0.603 (0.06) -1.061 (0.088) -0.752 (0.062) -1.133 (0.089) -0.831 (0.084) -0.991 (0.089)







TABLE S3. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Labour seats only. Models with (*) are
estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Labour 1.7 (0.095) 1.614 (0.094) 1.458 (0.091) 1.419 (0.092) 1.559 (0.079) 1.654 (0.113)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.18 (0.061) -0.457 (0.07) -0.1 (0.06) -0.126 (0.102) -0.398 (0.072) -0.49 (0.073)
R propensity to vote UKIP -0.463 (0.076) -0.237 (0.135) -0.095 (0.055) -0.62 (0.074) -0.292 (0.089) -0.253 (0.114)
R propensity to vote Green 0.261 (0.075) 0.195 (0.069) 0.167 (0.077) 0.325 (0.082) 0.211 (0.088) 0.195 (0.073)
Incumbent campaigned to
Remain in 2016 0.094 (0.298) 0.158 (0.333) -0.403 (0.298) -0.368 (0.339) -0.01 (0.245) 0.095 (0.268)
Incumbent undeclared in
2016 0.521 (0.492) 0.817 (0.561) 0.05 (0.499) 0.149 (0.558) 0.566 (0.418) 0.714 (0.457)
sd__(Intercept) 0.618 (0.06) 0.586 (0.083) 0.685 (0.061) 0.744 (0.081) 0.524 (0.046) 0.538 (0.056)
R did not vote in 2016 -1.629 (0.402) -0.235 (0.525)
R voted Leave in 2016 -0.933 (0.319) -0.957 (0.355)
Congruence 0.366 (0.176) 0.349 (0.207)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.274 (0.258) -0.232 (0.438)
Cons. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.407 (0.232) -0.48 (0.254)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 0.196 (0.29) 0.401 (0.479)
Lab. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.177 (0.284) -0.249 (0.295)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.427 (0.169) 0.045 (0.268)
UKIP share in 2015 by R











TABLE S3. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Labour seats only. Models with (*) are
estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not
vote in 2016 0.237 (0.097) 0.095 (0.187)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.028 (0.096) -0.095 (0.103)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did
not vote in 2016 0.652 (0.334) 1.115 (0.501)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.107 (0.3) 0.143 (0.328)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.26 (0.141) 0.069 (0.249)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.276 (0.13) -0.182 (0.141)
Pct. unemployed by R did
not vote in 2016 0.254 (0.169) 0.209 (0.239)
Pct. unemployed by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.007 (0.144) 0.097 (0.159)
Import shock by R did not
vote in 2016 0.076 (0.097) 0.372 (0.191)
Import shock by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.074 (0.084) -0.029 (0.095)
Two-term incumbent by R did
not vote in 2016 0.152 (0.262) 0.301 (0.492)
Three+ term incumbent by R
did not vote in 2016 0.046 (0.215) -0.111 (0.367)
Two-term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.501 (0.22) 0.418 (0.25)
Three+ term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.331 (0.199) 0.317 (0.223)
Cabinet member by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.044 (0.252) 0.53 (0.531)
Cabinet member by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.171 (0.266) 0.055 (0.28)







TABLE S3. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Labour seats only. Models with (*) are
estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
2014 support for Brexit by R
did not vote in 2016 0.633 (0.317) 0.408 (0.498)
2014 support for Brexit by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.229 (0.288) 0.147 (0.317)
East of England by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.399 (0.628) 0.384 (0.789)
London by R did not vote in
2016 -0.166 (0.4) -0.479 (0.651)
North East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.589 (0.425) 0.833 (0.666)
North West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.319 (0.341) 0.371 (0.506)
Scotland by R did not vote in
2016 -1.199 (0.698) -1.105 (0.867)
South East by R did not vote
in 2016 -1.137 (0.655) -2.069 (0.83)
South West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.897 (0.559) -0.087 (0.749)
Wales by R did not vote in
2016 0.478 (0.46) 0.793 (0.595)
West Midlands by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.284 (0.353) -0.412 (0.569)
Yorks. by R did not vote in
2016 -0.244 (0.338) -0.079 (0.483)
East of England by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.755 (0.456) 0.713 (0.481)
London by R voted Leave in
2016 0.542 (0.385) 0.095 (0.417)
North East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.539 (0.316) -0.351 (0.354)
North West by R voted Leave











TABLE S3. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Labour seats only. Models with (*) are
estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Scotland by R voted Leave in
2016 1.045 (0.791) 0.939 (0.79)
South East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.719 (0.622) -0.248 (0.665)
South West by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.993 (0.508) -0.895 (0.552)
Wales by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.314 (0.325) -0.286 (0.352)
West Midlands by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.064 (0.331) -0.116 (0.354)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in
2016 0.037 (0.286) 0.12 (0.314)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote
in 2016 0.175 (0.132) -0.572 (0.265)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.009 (0.102) -0.037 (0.106)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in
2016 -0.133 (0.175) 0.043 (0.287)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.145 (0.1) -0.243 (0.111)
PTV LibDem by R did not
vote in 2016 0.38 (0.095) 0.306 (0.255)
PTV LibDem by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.291 (0.118) 0.345 (0.118)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote
in 2016 0.142 (0.138) -0.246 (0.36)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.025 (0.111) -0.187 (0.138)
PTV Green by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.11 (0.1) 0.221 (0.23)
PTV Green by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.031 (0.099) 0.07 (0.125)







TABLE S3. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Labour seats only. Models with (*) are
estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Number of obs. 5420 4728 4863 3984 9370 8322
Number of groups 209 209 209 209 209 209











TABLE S4. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. All seats. Models with (*) are estimated
only on those who voted in the 2017 general election.
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
(Intercept) -2.047 (0.206) -1.089 (0.218) -0.979 (0.183) -0.054 (0.19) -1.002 (0.183) -0.756 (0.189)
Conservative share 2015 0.521 (0.207) 0.72 (0.215) 0.411 (0.166) 0.559 (0.178) 0.44 (0.159) 0.512 (0.166)
Labour share 2015 0.289 (0.161) 0.437 (0.168) -0.008 (0.126) 0.111 (0.136) 0.53 (0.127) 0.651 (0.141)
UKIP share 2015 0.1 (0.116) 0.136 (0.131) -0.153 (0.088) -0.141 (0.096) 0.193 (0.092) 0.147 (0.101)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011
census -0.025 (0.12) -0.018 (0.121) -0.027 (0.095) -0.025 (0.103) -0.034 (0.086) 0.005 (0.09)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications
of greater, 2011 census -0.047 (0.234) -0.115 (0.259) -0.328 (0.191) -0.342 (0.205) -0.157 (0.204) -0.148 (0.213)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census 0.031 (0.168) 0.15 (0.184) -0.008 (0.149) -0.053 (0.16) 0.171 (0.132) 0.111 (0.141)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011
census -0.033 (0.162) -0.119 (0.175) -0.122 (0.15) -0.167 (0.155) -0.152 (0.125) -0.229 (0.136)
Import shock 0.102 (0.073) 0.039 (0.077) -0.056 (0.057) -0.082 (0.062) 0.062 (0.062) 0.045 (0.065)
Incumbent has served two
terms -0.122 (0.147) -0.224 (0.158) -0.045 (0.119) -0.09 (0.129) -0.423 (0.126) -0.489 (0.133)
Incumbent has served three
or more terms -0.193 (0.146) -0.228 (0.159) -0.26 (0.127) -0.266 (0.141) -0.257 (0.126) -0.283 (0.139)
Incumbent is (shadow)
cabinet member -0.059 (0.193) -0.057 (0.212) 0.024 (0.168) -0.086 (0.174) -0.014 (0.169) -0.095 (0.177)
Constituency support for
Brexit in 2014 -0.122 (0.211) -0.039 (0.246) -0.146 (0.174) -0.188 (0.184) -0.213 (0.191) -0.074 (0.204)
East of England -0.022 (0.219) -0.183 (0.228) 0.087 (0.173) 0.066 (0.183) -0.129 (0.205) -0.195 (0.209)
London 0.261 (0.32) -0.004 (0.337) -0.032 (0.275) -0.114 (0.294) -0.088 (0.272) 0.027 (0.285)
North East 0.051 (0.456) -0.101 (0.465) -0.151 (0.405) -0.373 (0.424) 0.27 (0.363) -0.015 (0.371)
North West 0.171 (0.24) 0.196 (0.255) -0.102 (0.213) -0.053 (0.228) 0.298 (0.215) 0.336 (0.227)
Scotland 1.039 (0.616) 1.131 (0.638) 0.157 (0.581) 0.422 (0.611) 0.845 (0.551) 0.942 (0.563)
South East -0.021 (0.206) -0.064 (0.214) -0.185 (0.181) -0.006 (0.184) 0.018 (0.183) 0.013 (0.195)
South West 0.463 (0.212) 0.313 (0.229) 0.077 (0.186) 0 (0.187) 0.433 (0.199) 0.39 (0.21)
Wales 0.157 (0.341) 0.116 (0.369) -0.006 (0.289) -0.022 (0.294) 0.322 (0.285) 0.291 (0.3)
West Midlands 0.295 (0.247) 0.15 (0.236) 0.158 (0.195) 0.103 (0.195) 0.308 (0.196) 0.249 (0.202)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.245 (0.255) 0.081 (0.266) -0.207 (0.227) -0.201 (0.244) 0.023 (0.216) -0.026 (0.224)
R propensity to vote Cons. 1.885 (0.069) 1.725 (0.082) 1.473 (0.064) 1.452 (0.069) 1.616 (0.055) 1.685 (0.066)







TABLE S4. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. All seats. Models with (*) are estimated
only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Labour -0.597 (0.068) -0.951 (0.065) -0.501 (0.046) -0.816 (0.06) -0.621 (0.05) -0.804 (0.057)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.199 (0.05) -0.395 (0.05) -0.207 (0.057) -0.207 (0.057) -0.367 (0.051) -0.419 (0.051)
R propensity to vote UKIP 0.369 (0.069) 0.612 (0.08) 0.696 (0.053) 0.375 (0.057) 0.462 (0.063) 0.574 (0.063)
R propensity to vote Green -0.416 (0.072) -0.458 (0.06) -0.408 (0.053) -0.349 (0.052) -0.41 (0.053) -0.463 (0.06)
Labour incumbent 1.032 (0.303) 1.414 (0.314) -0.393 (0.295) -0.282 (0.305) 0.297 (0.248) 0.358 (0.247)
Incumbent campaigned to
Remain in 2016 0.004 (0.102) 0.099 (0.11) -0.109 (0.089) -0.116 (0.093) 0.004 (0.07) 0.007 (0.075)
Incumbent undeclared in
2016 0.254 (0.292) 0.824 (0.309) -0.053 (0.237) 0.192 (0.255) 0.315 (0.198) 0.527 (0.217)
Conservative share 2015,
Labour inc. -0.308 (0.251) -0.181 (0.275) -0.434 (0.251) -0.474 (0.274) -0.296 (0.199) -0.233 (0.208)
Labour share 2015, Labour
inc. 0.194 (0.268) 0.267 (0.297) 0.396 (0.239) 0.354 (0.264) 0.167 (0.201) 0.202 (0.222)
UKIP share 2015, Labour
inc. -0.171 (0.166) 0.063 (0.195) 0.05 (0.14) 0.217 (0.153) 0.067 (0.123) 0.16 (0.134)
Pct. aged 18-24, Labour inc. 0.095 (0.142) 0.059 (0.138) 0.094 (0.12) 0.026 (0.127) 0.063 (0.095) 0.046 (0.099)
Pct. w/ Level 4 quals or
greater, Labour inc. 0.187 (0.32) 0.029 (0.371) 0.432 (0.298) 0.444 (0.321) 0.279 (0.243) 0.23 (0.271)
Pct. non-white, Labour inc. -0.156 (0.192) -0.08 (0.222) -0.207 (0.174) 0.015 (0.185) -0.142 (0.14) -0.067 (0.152)
Pct. unempoyed, Labour inc. -0.012 (0.205) -0.019 (0.218) 0.096 (0.18) 0.15 (0.185) 0.065 (0.144) 0.105 (0.148)
Import shock, Labour inc. -0.019 (0.097) 0.055 (0.103) 0.119 (0.087) 0.142 (0.093) 0.029 (0.071) 0.03 (0.075)
Labour incumbent has











TABLE S4. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. All seats. Models with (*) are estimated
only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Labour incumbent has
served three or more terms -0.04 (0.207) -0.145 (0.233) 0.268 (0.199) 0.247 (0.218) 0.11 (0.163) 0.077 (0.171)
Labour incumbent is
(shadow) cabinet member -0.166 (0.265) -0.211 (0.288) -0.291 (0.239) -0.123 (0.245) -0.207 (0.191) -0.213 (0.2)
Const’y support for Brexit in
2014, Labour inc. 0.261 (0.309) -0.104 (0.341) 0.313 (0.283) 0.192 (0.294) 0.205 (0.23) 0.101 (0.244)
East of England, Labour inc. -0.229 (0.486) -0.166 (0.484) 0.006 (0.425) 0.063 (0.447) -0.085 (0.357) 0.056 (0.364)
London, Labour inc. -0.014 (0.428) 0.084 (0.451) 0.268 (0.393) 0.019 (0.414) 0.177 (0.347) 0.134 (0.356)
North East, Labour inc. 0.078 (0.521) 0.377 (0.51) -0.244 (0.467) 0.195 (0.478) 0.028 (0.394) 0.309 (0.415)
North West, Labour inc. -0.056 (0.335) 0.148 (0.34) -0.14 (0.298) -0.057 (0.315) -0.118 (0.253) -0.014 (0.264)
Scotland, Labour inc. -0.727 (0.722) -0.41 (0.745) -0.271 (0.731) 0.245 (0.769) 0.156 (0.651) 0.178 (0.669)
South East, Labour inc. 0.46 (0.536) 0.08 (0.552) -0.597 (0.572) -1.087 (0.632) 0.211 (0.446) 0.029 (0.462)
South West, Labour inc. 0.009 (0.463) 0.313 (0.468) -0.743 (0.472) -0.37 (0.528) -0.132 (0.361) 0.149 (0.379)
Wales, Labour inc. 0.172 (0.415) 0.041 (0.447) -0.211 (0.378) -0.25 (0.395) -0.161 (0.314) -0.151 (0.329)
West Midlands, Labour inc. -0.167 (0.392) -0.045 (0.365) -0.234 (0.333) -0.226 (0.337) -0.233 (0.286) -0.164 (0.285)
Yorkshire and the Humber,
Labour inc. -0.003 (0.347) 0.048 (0.356) 0.197 (0.315) 0.225 (0.322) 0.269 (0.27) 0.258 (0.275)
R propensity to vote Cons.,
Labour inc. -2.482 (0.097) -2.772 (0.143) -2.206 (0.096) -2.539 (0.13) -2.334 (0.09) -2.598 (0.107)
R propensity to vote Labour,
Labour inc. 2.288 (0.119) 2.551 (0.121) 1.934 (0.111) 2.185 (0.119) 2.046 (0.083) 2.328 (0.097)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem,
Labour inc. 0.019 (0.08) -0.059 (0.089) 0.108 (0.093) 0.084 (0.136) 0.053 (0.069) 0.013 (0.084)







TABLE S4. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. All seats. Models with (*) are estimated
only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote UKIP,
Labour inc. -0.831 (0.076) -0.847 (0.141) -0.789 (0.07) -0.972 (0.072) -0.746 (0.051) -0.857 (0.061)
R propensity to vote Green,
Labour inc. 0.675 (0.097) 0.65 (0.085) 0.572 (0.072) 0.66 (0.099) 0.617 (0.067) 0.662 (0.072)
sd__(Intercept) 0.573 (0.042) 0.525 (0.058) 0.543 (0.036) 0.476 (0.051) 0.42 (0.032) 0.387 (0.035)
R did not vote in 2016 -1.549 (0.225) -0.026 (0.284)
R voted Leave in 2016 0.385 (0.171) 0.474 (0.181)
Congruence 0.165 (0.055) 0.228 (0.061)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.164 (0.182) -0.224 (0.226)
Cons. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.067 (0.125) 0.1 (0.138)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.373 (0.187) -0.153 (0.232)
Lab. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.646 (0.124) -0.706 (0.136)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.33 (0.12) 0.094 (0.172)
UKIP share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.397 (0.086) -0.333 (0.096)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not
vote in 2016 0.19 (0.079) 0.18 (0.136)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.087 (0.065) -0.133 (0.073)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did
not vote in 2016 0.156 (0.241) 0.587 (0.345)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R











TABLE S4. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. All seats. Models with (*) are estimated
only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.111 (0.131) 0.14 (0.18)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.223 (0.098) -0.198 (0.111)
Pct. unemployed by R did
not vote in 2016 0.16 (0.149) 0.131 (0.185)
Pct. unemployed by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.007 (0.102) 0.074 (0.121)
Import shock by R did not
vote in 2016 0.027 (0.075) 0.05 (0.109)
Import shock by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.168 (0.055) -0.113 (0.06)
Two-term incumbent by R did
not vote in 2016 0.458 (0.184) 0.798 (0.238)
Three+ term incumbent by R
did not vote in 2016 0.117 (0.171) 0.136 (0.22)
Two-term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.435 (0.121) 0.44 (0.135)
Three+ term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.045 (0.118) 0.041 (0.133)
Cabinet member by R did not
vote in 2016 0.013 (0.204) 0.126 (0.315)
Cabinet member by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.056 (0.171) 0.073 (0.188)
2014 support for Brexit by R
did not vote in 2016 0.244 (0.236) 0.275 (0.364)
2014 support for Brexit by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.062 (0.184) -0.188 (0.203)
East of England by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.063 (0.289) 0.19 (0.36)
London by R did not vote in
2016 0.242 (0.312) -0.118 (0.4)







TABLE S4. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. All seats. Models with (*) are estimated
only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
North East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.596 (0.334) 0.312 (0.47)
North West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.221 (0.288) -0.056 (0.378)
Scotland by R did not vote in
2016 -1.267 (0.665) -0.681 (0.799)
South East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.501 (0.279) -0.049 (0.365)
South West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.213 (0.305) -0.137 (0.391)
Wales by R did not vote in
2016 0.164 (0.364) 0.451 (0.454)
West Midlands by R did not
vote in 2016 0 (0.271) -0.219 (0.389)
Yorks. by R did not vote in
2016 -0.282 (0.259) -0.152 (0.348)
East of England by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.219 (0.206) 0.291 (0.22)
London by R voted Leave in
2016 0.04 (0.259) -0.016 (0.284)
North East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.877 (0.247) -0.644 (0.281)
North West by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.535 (0.195) -0.452 (0.219)
Scotland by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.492 (0.589) -0.35 (0.626)
South East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.17 (0.192) 0.015 (0.209)
South West by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.574 (0.2) -0.425 (0.226)
Wales by R voted Leave in











TABLE S4. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. All seats. Models with (*) are estimated
only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
West Midlands by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.181 (0.193) -0.097 (0.214)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.422 (0.199) -0.164 (0.22)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.04 (0.108) -0.313 (0.12)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.165 (0.068) -0.198 (0.072)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in
2016 0.043 (0.138) -0.23 (0.156)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.029 (0.061) -0.026 (0.075)
PTV LibDem by R did not
vote in 2016 0.251 (0.091) 0.143 (0.112)
PTV LibDem by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.185 (0.055) 0.238 (0.065)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote
in 2016 0.125 (0.105) 0.009 (0.183)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.087 (0.056) -0.28 (0.064)
PTV Green by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.093 (0.103) 0.103 (0.122)
PTV Green by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.081 (0.081) 0.109 (0.08)
Number of obs. 13361 11745 13860 11814 25189 22673
Number of groups 524 524 524 524 524 524
SD, random area intercept 0.573 0.525 0.543 0.476 0.42 0.387







TABLE S5. Conditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Models with (*) are estimated only on those
who voted in the 2017 general election.
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
(Intercept) -2.002 (0.288) -0.964 (0.303) -1.067 (0.247) -0.154 (0.251) -0.929 (0.196) -0.653 (0.201)
Conservative share 2015 0.517 (0.206) 0.713 (0.209) 0.418 (0.169) 0.572 (0.176) 0.459 (0.158) 0.538 (0.166)
Labour share 2015 0.294 (0.163) 0.448 (0.168) -0.013 (0.128) 0.104 (0.133) 0.513 (0.128) 0.632 (0.141)
UKIP share 2015 0.096 (0.121) 0.122 (0.136) -0.141 (0.091) -0.13 (0.096) 0.162 (0.095) 0.11 (0.105)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011
census -0.029 (0.122) -0.028 (0.121) -0.023 (0.095) -0.014 (0.104) -0.031 (0.087) 0.005 (0.091)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications
of greater, 2011 census -0.049 (0.244) -0.127 (0.264) -0.319 (0.192) -0.324 (0.206) -0.176 (0.204) -0.177 (0.216)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census 0.03 (0.166) 0.148 (0.178) -0.003 (0.146) -0.058 (0.157) 0.158 (0.132) 0.096 (0.141)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011
census -0.033 (0.162) -0.116 (0.174) -0.124 (0.149) -0.16 (0.156) -0.153 (0.126) -0.227 (0.136)
Import shock 0.102 (0.072) 0.04 (0.076) -0.056 (0.057) -0.081 (0.062) 0.058 (0.062) 0.043 (0.066)
Incumbent has served two
terms -0.122 (0.149) -0.228 (0.159) -0.045 (0.119) -0.093 (0.128) -0.422 (0.126) -0.491 (0.134)
Incumbent has served three
or more terms -0.193 (0.148) -0.229 (0.16) -0.261 (0.129) -0.271 (0.139) -0.267 (0.127) -0.297 (0.139)
Incumbent is (shadow)
cabinet member -0.061 (0.194) -0.066 (0.211) 0.036 (0.165) -0.077 (0.175) -0.031 (0.168) -0.117 (0.178)
Constituency support for
Brexit in 2014 -0.124 (0.222) -0.05 (0.252) -0.14 (0.174) -0.175 (0.185) -0.23 (0.192) -0.1 (0.208)
East of England -0.024 (0.217) -0.189 (0.227) 0.082 (0.175) 0.072 (0.183) -0.123 (0.204) -0.193 (0.212)
London 0.263 (0.321) -0.003 (0.338) -0.045 (0.272) -0.115 (0.292) -0.097 (0.27) 0.019 (0.287)
North East 0.052 (0.458) -0.093 (0.474) -0.156 (0.407) -0.388 (0.423) 0.242 (0.371) -0.044 (0.375)
North West 0.17 (0.239) 0.191 (0.254) -0.111 (0.215) -0.051 (0.227) 0.297 (0.214) 0.333 (0.228)
Scotland 1.025 (0.622) 1.11 (0.631) 0.169 (0.588) 0.447 (0.614) 0.848 (0.565) 0.935 (0.566)
South East -0.019 (0.205) -0.06 (0.217) -0.193 (0.181) -0.01 (0.186) -0.012 (0.184) -0.019 (0.199)
South West 0.467 (0.212) 0.317 (0.227) 0.07 (0.184) 0 (0.19) 0.423 (0.201) 0.378 (0.215)
Wales 0.163 (0.34) 0.109 (0.365) -0.011 (0.289) -0.008 (0.293) 0.332 (0.281) 0.302 (0.301)
West Midlands 0.296 (0.248) 0.153 (0.236) 0.149 (0.198) 0.099 (0.192) 0.308 (0.196) 0.247 (0.202)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.249 (0.26) 0.089 (0.269) -0.218 (0.227) -0.197 (0.245) 0.017 (0.216) -0.027 (0.223)











TABLE S5. Conditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Models with (*) are estimated only on those
who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Labour -0.598 (0.067) -0.952 (0.066) -0.5 (0.046) -0.817 (0.059) -0.62 (0.051) -0.801 (0.057)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.2 (0.049) -0.394 (0.05) -0.208 (0.056) -0.209 (0.057) -0.367 (0.051) -0.419 (0.05)
R propensity to vote UKIP 0.37 (0.068) 0.613 (0.08) 0.695 (0.053) 0.374 (0.057) 0.458 (0.062) 0.569 (0.064)
R propensity to vote Green -0.415 (0.071) -0.459 (0.059) -0.408 (0.053) -0.349 (0.052) -0.406 (0.053) -0.459 (0.06)
Labour incumbent 1.029 (0.304) 1.395 (0.324) -0.386 (0.281) -0.27 (0.297) 0.299 (0.244) 0.359 (0.248)
Incumbent campaigned to
Remain in 2016 -0.033 (0.233) -0.004 (0.225) -0.029 (0.187) -0.035 (0.177) 0.003 (0.081) 0.004 (0.08)
Incumbent undeclared in
2016 0.219 (0.33) 0.732 (0.34) 0.025 (0.265) 0.273 (0.275) 0.26 (0.218) 0.445 (0.231)
Contrast between top two -0.06 (0.251) -0.154 (0.257) 0.119 (0.182) 0.126 (0.178) -0.106 (0.1) -0.147 (0.09)
Conservative share 2015,
Labour inc. -0.305 (0.255) -0.172 (0.274) -0.44 (0.244) -0.488 (0.275) -0.307 (0.198) -0.247 (0.207)
Labour share 2015, Labour
inc. 0.184 (0.29) 0.26 (0.303) 0.4 (0.25) 0.36 (0.271) 0.168 (0.2) 0.205 (0.219)
UKIP share 2015, Labour
inc. -0.167 (0.163) 0.079 (0.19) 0.04 (0.141) 0.205 (0.152) 0.064 (0.124) 0.155 (0.133)
Pct. aged 18-24, Labour inc. 0.099 (0.144) 0.072 (0.138) 0.09 (0.12) 0.013 (0.128) 0.061 (0.096) 0.047 (0.099)
Pct. w/ Level 4 quals or
greater, Labour inc. 0.186 (0.336) 0.048 (0.379) 0.422 (0.302) 0.422 (0.325) 0.275 (0.245) 0.229 (0.272)
Pct. non-white, Labour inc. -0.154 (0.192) -0.079 (0.218) -0.21 (0.173) 0.019 (0.184) -0.144 (0.14) -0.072 (0.153)
Pct. unempoyed, Labour inc. -0.013 (0.207) -0.02 (0.219) 0.098 (0.182) 0.142 (0.186) 0.065 (0.144) 0.105 (0.149)
Import shock, Labour inc. -0.02 (0.094) 0.054 (0.102) 0.118 (0.086) 0.139 (0.093) 0.032 (0.071) 0.032 (0.076)







TABLE S5. Conditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Models with (*) are estimated only on those
who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Labour incumbent has
served two terms -0.224 (0.225) -0.256 (0.253) -0.092 (0.208) -0.037 (0.23) -0.114 (0.167) -0.063 (0.177)
Labour incumbent has
served three or more terms -0.037 (0.211) -0.145 (0.234) 0.269 (0.201) 0.257 (0.217) 0.116 (0.165) 0.085 (0.171)
Labour incumbent is
(shadow) cabinet member -0.158 (0.265) -0.197 (0.287) -0.308 (0.238) -0.14 (0.251) -0.208 (0.19) -0.216 (0.198)
Const’y support for Brexit in
2014, Labour inc. 0.259 (0.324) -0.087 (0.349) 0.305 (0.283) 0.174 (0.299) 0.203 (0.231) 0.103 (0.248)
East of England, Labour inc. -0.246 (0.492) -0.171 (0.481) 0.019 (0.437) 0.062 (0.448) -0.083 (0.354) 0.062 (0.362)
London, Labour inc. -0.013 (0.423) 0.092 (0.45) 0.269 (0.395) 0.01 (0.414) 0.19 (0.344) 0.148 (0.353)
North East, Labour inc. 0.075 (0.517) 0.378 (0.514) -0.249 (0.474) 0.196 (0.478) 0.026 (0.399) 0.304 (0.417)
North West, Labour inc. -0.05 (0.331) 0.161 (0.342) -0.138 (0.296) -0.071 (0.312) -0.115 (0.252) -0.012 (0.262)
Scotland, Labour inc. -0.726 (0.725) -0.401 (0.734) -0.278 (0.729) 0.235 (0.777) 0.138 (0.656) 0.171 (0.674)
South East, Labour inc. 0.47 (0.547) 0.08 (0.545) -0.605 (0.574) -1.098 (0.64) 0.214 (0.447) 0.021 (0.468)
South West, Labour inc. 0 (0.463) 0.324 (0.467) -0.746 (0.475) -0.374 (0.531) -0.124 (0.359) 0.153 (0.383)
Wales, Labour inc. 0.166 (0.409) 0.06 (0.44) -0.207 (0.373) -0.273 (0.396) -0.171 (0.311) -0.16 (0.327)
West Midlands, Labour inc. -0.163 (0.392) -0.033 (0.365) -0.243 (0.331) -0.239 (0.336) -0.225 (0.285) -0.152 (0.285)
Yorkshire and the Humber,
Labour inc. -0.001 (0.352) 0.056 (0.364) 0.198 (0.323) 0.206 (0.318) 0.274 (0.274) 0.261 (0.275)
R propensity to vote Cons.,
Labour inc. -2.484 (0.096) -2.774 (0.144) -2.207 (0.096) -2.541 (0.131) -2.337 (0.089) -2.603 (0.108)
R propensity to vote Labour,











TABLE S5. Conditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Models with (*) are estimated only on those
who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem,
Labour inc. 0.018 (0.079) -0.062 (0.089) 0.109 (0.092) 0.085 (0.136) 0.051 (0.068) 0.008 (0.083)
R propensity to vote UKIP,
Labour inc. -0.83 (0.076) -0.849 (0.141) -0.79 (0.07) -0.972 (0.073) -0.737 (0.051) -0.847 (0.062)
R propensity to vote Green,
Labour inc. 0.675 (0.096) 0.651 (0.084) 0.572 (0.072) 0.659 (0.099) 0.613 (0.066) 0.657 (0.071)
MP supported Remain,
contrast 0.048 (0.409) 0.132 (0.355) -0.101 (0.31) -0.097 (0.267)
MP supported neither
Remain nor Leave, contrast -0.006 (1.005) -0.001 (1.009) -0.007 (0.996) 0.01 (0.992)
sd__(Intercept) 0.576 (0.044) 0.526 (0.058) 0.544 (0.036) 0.477 (0.051) 0.421 (0.032) 0.39 (0.035)
R did not vote in 2016 -1.562 (0.227) -0.049 (0.285)
R voted Leave in 2016 0.351 (0.172) 0.435 (0.186)
Congruence 0.03 (0.079) 0.058 (0.095)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.166 (0.182) -0.244 (0.227)
Cons. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.044 (0.125) 0.067 (0.14)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.34 (0.185) -0.126 (0.235)
Lab. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.623 (0.126) -0.675 (0.137)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.289 (0.118) 0.133 (0.175)
UKIP share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.334 (0.088) -0.255 (0.103)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not
vote in 2016 0.187 (0.079) 0.175 (0.136)







TABLE S5. Conditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Models with (*) are estimated only on those
who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.086 (0.065) -0.133 (0.073)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did
not vote in 2016 0.174 (0.243) 0.611 (0.343)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.283 (0.195) -0.235 (0.214)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.091 (0.132) 0.159 (0.183)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.199 (0.098) -0.168 (0.112)
Pct. unemployed by R did
not vote in 2016 0.157 (0.149) 0.132 (0.186)
Pct. unemployed by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.012 (0.102) 0.067 (0.122)
Import shock by R did not
vote in 2016 0.027 (0.076) 0.053 (0.108)
Import shock by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.166 (0.055) -0.112 (0.061)
Two-term incumbent by R did
not vote in 2016 0.456 (0.184) 0.796 (0.239)
Three+ term incumbent by R
did not vote in 2016 0.12 (0.172) 0.148 (0.22)
Two-term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.43 (0.121) 0.436 (0.137)
Three+ term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.054 (0.12) 0.053 (0.134)
Cabinet member by R did not
vote in 2016 0.037 (0.204) 0.146 (0.315)
Cabinet member by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.022 (0.168) 0.116 (0.189)
2014 support for Brexit by R











TABLE S5. Conditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Models with (*) are estimated only on those
who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
2014 support for Brexit by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.025 (0.184) -0.135 (0.206)
East of England by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.099 (0.291) 0.157 (0.36)
London by R did not vote in
2016 0.236 (0.311) -0.11 (0.395)
North East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.567 (0.338) 0.341 (0.476)
North West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.235 (0.287) -0.069 (0.384)
Scotland by R did not vote in
2016 -1.272 (0.657) -0.665 (0.795)
South East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.482 (0.28) -0.031 (0.363)
South West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.208 (0.305) -0.137 (0.387)
Wales by R did not vote in
2016 0.161 (0.366) 0.422 (0.459)
West Midlands by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.01 (0.273) -0.215 (0.392)
Yorks. by R did not vote in
2016 -0.281 (0.257) -0.142 (0.35)
East of England by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.201 (0.206) 0.268 (0.224)
London by R voted Leave in
2016 0.035 (0.256) -0.032 (0.287)
North East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.83 (0.248) -0.587 (0.281)
North West by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.542 (0.193) -0.465 (0.22)
Scotland by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.455 (0.586) -0.317 (0.62)







TABLE S5. Conditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Models with (*) are estimated only on those
who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
South East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.134 (0.194) 0.054 (0.215)
South West by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.567 (0.201) -0.418 (0.23)
Wales by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.601 (0.237) -0.513 (0.267)
West Midlands by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.194 (0.195) -0.116 (0.216)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.429 (0.198) -0.181 (0.219)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.048 (0.109) -0.318 (0.12)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.17 (0.068) -0.203 (0.072)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in
2016 0.046 (0.14) -0.236 (0.155)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.031 (0.06) -0.028 (0.075)
PTV LibDem by R did not
vote in 2016 0.254 (0.091) 0.147 (0.109)
PTV LibDem by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.186 (0.056) 0.24 (0.065)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote
in 2016 0.124 (0.105) 0.009 (0.18)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.086 (0.057) -0.28 (0.065)
PTV Green by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.094 (0.104) 0.101 (0.124)
PTV Green by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.079 (0.081) 0.107 (0.079)











TABLE S5. Conditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice. Models with (*) are estimated only on those
who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Number of obs. 13361 11745 13860 11814 25189 22673
Number of groups 524 524 524 524 524 524
SD, random area intercept 0.576 0.526 0.544 0.477 0.421 0.39







TABLE S6. Multilevel linear models of perceptions of incumbents MPs’ stances on Brexit. Models with (*) are estimated only on
those who voted in the 2017 general election.
Term Con. incumb. Con. incumb.(*) Lab. incumb. Lab. incumb.(*) All All voters(*)
(Intercept) 3.614 (0.1) 3.617 (0.096) 3.008 (0.168) 3.005 (0.178) 3.609 (0.09) 3.613 (0.088)
Conservative share 2015 0.132 (0.104) 0.096 (0.1) 0.039 (0.084) 0.042 (0.083) 0.137 (0.081) 0.128 (0.079)
Labour share 2015 -0.103 (0.061) -0.122 (0.059) 0.08 (0.122) 0.062 (0.115) -0.07 (0.056) -0.062 (0.055)
UKIP share 2015 0.043 (0.044) 0.032 (0.045) 0.038 (0.059) 0.049 (0.056) 0.035 (0.041) 0.024 (0.043)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011
census -0.014 (0.042) -0.009 (0.042) 0.02 (0.033) 0.028 (0.034) 0.021 (0.039) 0.008 (0.039)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications
of greater, 2011 census -0.154 (0.119) -0.14 (0.127) -0.016 (0.131) -0.012 (0.124) -0.109 (0.113) -0.144 (0.117)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census 0.146 (0.074) 0.136 (0.068) 0.002 (0.056) -0.011 (0.052) 0.108 (0.064) 0.106 (0.056)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011
census -0.021 (0.066) -0.03 (0.068) -0.007 (0.061) 0.003 (0.057) -0.042 (0.059) -0.051 (0.057)
Import shock 0.007 (0.029) 0.011 (0.029) 0.049 (0.032) 0.057 (0.032) 0.023 (0.026) 0.025 (0.029)
Incumbent has served two
terms 0.012 (0.063) 0.021 (0.058) -0.091 (0.091) -0.081 (0.086) -0.002 (0.056) 0 (0.054)
Incumbent has served three
or more terms 0.027 (0.067) 0.02 (0.064) -0.065 (0.083) -0.053 (0.078) -0.007 (0.054) 0.005 (0.055)
Incumbent is (shadow)
cabinet member 0.047 (0.084) 0.067 (0.084) 0.073 (0.092) 0.083 (0.093) 0.027 (0.077) 0.042 (0.071)
Constituency support for
Brexit in 2014 -0.056 (0.097) -0.038 (0.105) 0.099 (0.118) 0.094 (0.115) 0.003 (0.097) -0.026 (0.097)
East of England -0.011 (0.106) 0.018 (0.107) 0.062 (0.236) 0.025 (0.228) 0.034 (0.099) 0.054 (0.103)
London 0.032 (0.145) 0.051 (0.142) 0.138 (0.178) 0.179 (0.179) 0.103 (0.136) 0.158 (0.129)
North East 0.153 (0.24) 0.119 (0.233) 0.141 (0.149) 0.127 (0.158) 0.251 (0.21) 0.233 (0.184)
North West 0.245 (0.112) 0.253 (0.106) 0.142 (0.141) 0.162 (0.137) 0.224 (0.097) 0.276 (0.095)
Scotland 0.481 (0.363) 0.445 (0.365) 0.325 (0.342) 0.333 (0.325) 0.506 (0.357) 0.404 (0.337)
South East 0.036 (0.099) 0.035 (0.1) 0.011 (0.268) 0.029 (0.261) 0.07 (0.096) 0.084 (0.104)
South West 0.134 (0.109) 0.148 (0.116) -0.012 (0.197) -0.019 (0.191) 0.155 (0.106) 0.195 (0.119)
Wales 0.286 (0.141) 0.294 (0.146) 0.126 (0.147) 0.13 (0.143) 0.349 (0.126) 0.36 (0.132)
West Midlands 0.148 (0.111) 0.163 (0.113) 0.174 (0.141) 0.179 (0.143) 0.182 (0.103) 0.193 (0.108)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.355 (0.115) 0.365 (0.114) 0.161 (0.126) 0.171 (0.126) 0.348 (0.105) 0.364 (0.103)











TABLE S6. Multilevel linear models of perceptions of incumbents MPs’ stances on Brexit. Models with (*) are estimated only on
those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Con. incumb. Con. incumb.(*) Lab. incumb. Lab. incumb.(*) All All voters(*)
R propensity to vote Labour 0.012 (0.025) 0.003 (0.026) -0.071 (0.031) -0.076 (0.033) -0.014 (0.021) -0.033 (0.022)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.016 (0.018) -0.018 (0.021) 0.007 (0.024) 0.014 (0.024) -0.024 (0.017) -0.02 (0.018)
R propensity to vote UKIP -0.035 (0.03) -0.043 (0.031) 0.03 (0.043) 0.024 (0.043) -0.014 (0.028) -0.017 (0.028)
R propensity to vote Green 0.04 (0.021) 0.034 (0.021) -0.003 (0.023) -0.004 (0.024) 0.04 (0.019) 0.038 (0.019)
R did not vote in 2016 -0.167 (0.182) -0.312 (0.215) -0.184 (0.246) -0.038 (0.373) -0.107 (0.197) -0.096 (0.157)
R voted Leave in 2016 0.033 (0.11) 0.053 (0.114) 0.151 (0.182) 0.177 (0.197) 0.075 (0.086) 0.106 (0.085)
Incumbent campaigned to
Remain in 2016 -0.549 (0.034) -0.563 (0.034) -0.52 (0.125) -0.521 (0.141) -0.548 (0.033) -0.558 (0.033)
Incumbent undeclared in
2016 -0.459 (0.11) -0.393 (0.103) -0.267 (0.218) -0.342 (0.198) -0.401 (0.096) -0.383 (0.095)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.043 (0.17) 0.227 (0.223) -0.002 (0.133) -0.203 (0.271) -0.043 (0.078) 0 (0.144)
Cons. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.051 (0.116) 0.077 (0.132) 0.008 (0.092) -0.008 (0.102) 0.032 (0.054) 0.04 (0.057)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.033 (0.094) 0.159 (0.163) -0.052 (0.179) -0.011 (0.293) 0.026 (0.093) 0.15 (0.19)
Lab. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.151 (0.072) 0.184 (0.075) -0.117 (0.145) -0.093 (0.14) 0.059 (0.062) 0.077 (0.068)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 0.131 (0.089) 0.083 (0.127) 0.018 (0.081) 0.109 (0.152) 0.084 (0.059) 0.123 (0.096)
UKIP share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.025 (0.049) 0.012 (0.053) 0.04 (0.069) 0.025 (0.067) 0.012 (0.04) 0.026 (0.043)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not
vote in 2016 0.202 (0.091) 0.275 (0.112) -0.042 (0.056) -0.057 (0.07) 0.01 (0.046) 0.015 (0.052)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.011 (0.053) -0.032 (0.053) -0.045 (0.05) -0.057 (0.05) -0.025 (0.031) -0.03 (0.029)







TABLE S6. Multilevel linear models of perceptions of incumbents MPs’ stances on Brexit. Models with (*) are estimated only on
those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Con. incumb. Con. incumb.(*) Lab. incumb. Lab. incumb.(*) All All voters(*)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did
not vote in 2016 0.378 (0.197) 0.235 (0.331) -0.077 (0.273) -0.165 (0.441) 0.11 (0.149) 0.034 (0.281)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.04 (0.107) 0.028 (0.119) 0.038 (0.166) 0.063 (0.169) 0.051 (0.088) 0.072 (0.086)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.047 (0.122) -0.231 (0.206) 0.082 (0.112) 0.157 (0.122) 0.057 (0.079) 0.08 (0.077)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.106 (0.088) -0.069 (0.089) 0.001 (0.078) 0.013 (0.068) -0.057 (0.054) -0.041 (0.046)
Pct. unemployed by R did
not vote in 2016 0.049 (0.176) 0.13 (0.227) 0.007 (0.097) -0.137 (0.1) 0.011 (0.077) -0.037 (0.086)
Pct. unemployed by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.029 (0.074) 0.043 (0.072) 0.107 (0.079) 0.12 (0.068) 0.084 (0.053) 0.1 (0.05)
Import shock by R did not
vote in 2016 0.093 (0.073) 0.047 (0.074) -0.024 (0.043) -0.223 (0.074) 0.02 (0.036) -0.077 (0.05)
Import shock by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.016 (0.032) -0.02 (0.032) -0.047 (0.036) -0.052 (0.038) -0.027 (0.023) -0.032 (0.024)
Two-term incumbent by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.029 (0.127) -0.054 (0.169) 0.055 (0.155) -0.02 (0.206) -0.024 (0.092) -0.03 (0.098)
Three+ term incumbent by R
did not vote in 2016 -0.103 (0.101) -0.077 (0.238) 0.095 (0.11) -0.08 (0.168) -0.007 (0.065) -0.081 (0.095)
Two-term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.096 (0.072) -0.115 (0.072) -0.023 (0.117) -0.049 (0.111) -0.059 (0.05) -0.079 (0.052)
Three+ term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.078 (0.108) -0.087 (0.1) 0.064 (0.116) 0.029 (0.105) -0.032 (0.061) -0.058 (0.058)
Cabinet member by R did not
vote in 2016 0.052 (0.138) -0.285 (0.197) 0.086 (0.127) -0.108 (0.215) 0.076 (0.097) -0.166 (0.158)
Cabinet member by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.099 (0.096) -0.104 (0.101) -0.026 (0.099) -0.026 (0.105) -0.059 (0.068) -0.066 (0.067)
2014 support for Brexit by R
did not vote in 2016 0.204 (0.153) 0.098 (0.242) -0.153 (0.275) -0.087 (0.367) -0.012 (0.156) -0.017 (0.218)
2014 support for Brexit by R











TABLE S6. Multilevel linear models of perceptions of incumbents MPs’ stances on Brexit. Models with (*) are estimated only on
those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Con. incumb. Con. incumb.(*) Lab. incumb. Lab. incumb.(*) All All voters(*)
East of England by R did not
vote in 2016 0.17 (0.213) 0.527 (0.218) -0.329 (0.422) -0.265 (0.476) 0.064 (0.214) 0.296 (0.186)
London by R did not vote in
2016 -0.11 (0.294) 0.383 (0.453) -0.113 (0.384) -0.096 (0.333) -0.139 (0.278) 0.041 (0.264)
North East by R did not vote
in 2016 0.56 (0.465) 0.535 (0.552) 0.306 (0.329) 0.029 (0.312) 0.336 (0.287) 0.228 (0.279)
North West by R did not vote
in 2016 0.109 (0.21) 0.485 (0.27) 0.257 (0.252) -0.081 (0.261) 0.16 (0.171) 0.133 (0.172)
Scotland by R did not vote in
2016 0.198 (1.053) 0.348 (1.122) -0.491 (0.589) -0.012 (0.679) -0.414 (0.698) 0.155 (0.567)
South East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.02 (0.27) 0.39 (0.219) 0.065 (0.491) -0.225 (0.694) -0.041 (0.273) 0.251 (0.23)
South West by R did not vote
in 2016 0.231 (0.179) 0.356 (0.215) 0.312 (0.279) 0.005 (0.513) 0.212 (0.17) 0.196 (0.207)
Wales by R did not vote in
2016 0.312 (0.26) 0.303 (0.469) 0.134 (0.257) 0.008 (0.343) 0.136 (0.19) 0.198 (0.257)
West Midlands by R did not
vote in 2016 0.238 (0.178) 0.4 (0.185) 0.083 (0.256) 0.237 (0.364) 0.156 (0.181) 0.31 (0.19)
Yorks. by R did not vote in
2016 0.064 (0.299) 0.092 (0.303) 0.088 (0.202) 0.035 (0.285) 0.002 (0.173) 0.159 (0.198)
East of England by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.02 (0.158) -0.01 (0.138) -0.217 (0.287) -0.091 (0.272) -0.044 (0.14) -0.062 (0.12)
London by R voted Leave in
2016 0.055 (0.18) 0.045 (0.188) -0.282 (0.228) -0.393 (0.243) -0.103 (0.151) -0.151 (0.138)
North East by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.076 (0.305) 0.162 (0.295) -0.137 (0.179) -0.116 (0.185) -0.08 (0.13) -0.044 (0.116)
North West by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.125 (0.119) -0.107 (0.123) -0.116 (0.161) -0.163 (0.17) -0.111 (0.085) -0.129 (0.09)
Scotland by R voted Leave in
2016 0.224 (0.468) 0.216 (0.454) 0.537 (0.533) 0.52 (0.533) 0.318 (0.377) 0.339 (0.363)
South East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.048 (0.132) -0.026 (0.125) -0.258 (0.31) -0.184 (0.391) -0.118 (0.12) -0.108 (0.119)







TABLE S6. Multilevel linear models of perceptions of incumbents MPs’ stances on Brexit. Models with (*) are estimated only on
those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Con. incumb. Con. incumb.(*) Lab. incumb. Lab. incumb.(*) All All voters(*)
South West by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.002 (0.143) 0.027 (0.151) -0.138 (0.261) -0.273 (0.29) -0.042 (0.138) -0.052 (0.148)
Wales by R voted Leave in
2016 0.042 (0.182) 0.071 (0.2) -0.143 (0.223) -0.186 (0.211) -0.036 (0.147) -0.043 (0.151)
West Midlands by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.029 (0.143) -0.043 (0.149) -0.203 (0.175) -0.235 (0.203) -0.082 (0.122) -0.106 (0.132)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.216 (0.135) -0.16 (0.143) -0.21 (0.153) -0.223 (0.167) -0.178 (0.1) -0.166 (0.112)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote
in 2016 0.095 (0.061) -0.022 (0.081) -0.025 (0.066) 0.032 (0.127) 0.055 (0.036) 0.027 (0.069)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.195 (0.037) 0.204 (0.038) -0.063 (0.041) -0.065 (0.044) 0.113 (0.027) 0.119 (0.03)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in
2016 0.046 (0.067) -0.045 (0.115) -0.002 (0.063) 0.047 (0.089) 0.018 (0.04) -0.016 (0.079)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.061 (0.035) -0.06 (0.038) 0.122 (0.051) 0.127 (0.05) 0.014 (0.031) 0.018 (0.032)
PTV LibDem by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.056 (0.039) -0.029 (0.079) 0.032 (0.059) -0.008 (0.077) -0.023 (0.028) -0.026 (0.058)
PTV LibDem by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.035 (0.032) -0.024 (0.036) -0.006 (0.04) -0.007 (0.038) -0.035 (0.025) -0.03 (0.026)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.012 (0.077) 0.063 (0.109) 0.012 (0.061) -0.026 (0.098) -0.004 (0.044) 0.016 (0.07)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.012 (0.036) 0.026 (0.036) -0.081 (0.045) -0.069 (0.047) -0.028 (0.033) -0.016 (0.033)
PTV Green by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.001 (0.051) 0.048 (0.059) 0.039 (0.066) 0.073 (0.094) 0.015 (0.039) 0.059 (0.046)
PTV Green by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.003 (0.028) 0.013 (0.03) 0.029 (0.037) 0.042 (0.041) 0.008 (0.023) 0.017 (0.027)
sd__(Intercept) 0.187 (0.019) 0.161 (0.02) 0.206 (0.025) 0.175 (0.027) 0.196 (0.017) 0.171 (0.017)











TABLE S6. Multilevel linear models of perceptions of incumbents MPs’ stances on Brexit. Models with (*) are estimated only on
those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Con. incumb. Con. incumb.(*) Lab. incumb. Lab. incumb.(*) All All voters(*)
Labour incumbent -0.604 (0.123) -0.607 (0.139)
Conservative share 2015,
Labour inc. -0.1 (0.12) -0.127 (0.108)
Labour share 2015, Labour
inc. 0.06 (0.09) 0.024 (0.087)
UKIP share 2015, Labour
inc. -0.003 (0.059) 0.016 (0.056)
Pct. aged 18-24, Labour inc. -0.026 (0.044) -0.004 (0.041)
Pct. w/ Level 4 quals or
greater, Labour inc. 0.033 (0.136) 0.087 (0.129)
Pct. non-white, Labour inc. -0.075 (0.067) -0.085 (0.066)
Pct. unempoyed, Labour inc. 0.038 (0.067) 0.051 (0.062)
Import shock, Labour inc. 0.01 (0.035) 0.011 (0.035)
Labour incumbent has
served two terms -0.054 (0.073) -0.056 (0.075)
Labour incumbent has
served three or more terms 0.009 (0.073) -0.009 (0.08)
Labour incumbent is
(shadow) cabinet member 0.061 (0.097) 0.064 (0.096)
Const’y support for Brexit in
2014, Labour inc. 0.034 (0.122) 0.082 (0.113)
East of England, Labour inc. -0.113 (0.172) -0.062 (0.179)
London, Labour inc. -0.03 (0.167) -0.081 (0.18)
North East, Labour inc. -0.133 (0.24) -0.141 (0.229)







TABLE S6. Multilevel linear models of perceptions of incumbents MPs’ stances on Brexit. Models with (*) are estimated only on
those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Con. incumb. Con. incumb.(*) Lab. incumb. Lab. incumb.(*) All All voters(*)
North West, Labour inc. -0.067 (0.121) -0.135 (0.136)
Scotland, Labour inc. -0.21 (0.42) -0.111 (0.398)
South East, Labour inc. -0.095 (0.234) -0.135 (0.241)
South West, Labour inc. -0.213 (0.178) -0.341 (0.178)
Wales, Labour inc. -0.28 (0.151) -0.299 (0.159)
West Midlands, Labour inc. -0.073 (0.132) -0.073 (0.136)
Yorkshire and the Humber,
Labour inc. -0.176 (0.13) -0.198 (0.132)
R propensity to vote Cons.,
Labour inc. -0.038 (0.029) -0.018 (0.031)
R propensity to vote Labour,
Labour inc. -0.021 (0.026) 0.01 (0.024)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem,
Labour inc. 0.061 (0.022) 0.056 (0.026)
R propensity to vote UKIP,
Labour inc. 0.016 (0.023) 0.004 (0.027)
R propensity to vote Green,
Labour inc. -0.037 (0.027) -0.038 (0.023)
Number of obs. 15819 14351 9370 8322 25189 22673
Number of groups 315 315 209 209 524 524











TABLE S7. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position.
Conservative seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election.
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
(Intercept) -2.004 (0.24) -0.744 (0.25) -1.711 (0.21) -0.895 (0.214) -1.508 (0.22) -1.097 (0.213)
Conservative share 2015 0.564 (0.207) 0.774 (0.215) 0.399 (0.153) 0.552 (0.159) 0.544 (0.193) 0.593 (0.201)
Labour share 2015 0.281 (0.162) 0.401 (0.169) -0.003 (0.115) 0.1 (0.118) 0.423 (0.142) 0.461 (0.156)
UKIP share 2015 0.119 (0.114) 0.152 (0.13) -0.159 (0.081) -0.15 (0.083) 0.147 (0.107) 0.134 (0.114)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011
census -0.014 (0.121) 0.009 (0.117) -0.041 (0.087) -0.04 (0.093) -0.077 (0.107) -0.059 (0.11)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications
of greater, 2011 census -0.064 (0.239) -0.116 (0.268) -0.359 (0.18) -0.378 (0.189) -0.115 (0.244) -0.113 (0.244)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census 0.037 (0.166) 0.143 (0.188) 0.016 (0.139) -0.067 (0.138) 0.067 (0.164) 0.138 (0.174)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011
census -0.034 (0.162) -0.093 (0.175) -0.142 (0.141) -0.178 (0.146) -0.058 (0.151) -0.142 (0.158)
Import shock 0.109 (0.073) 0.047 (0.078) -0.058 (0.053) -0.073 (0.055) 0.097 (0.072) 0.088 (0.075)
Incumbent has served two
terms -0.105 (0.146) -0.182 (0.16) -0.037 (0.107) -0.074 (0.111) -0.274 (0.143) -0.326 (0.151)
Incumbent has served three
or more terms -0.186 (0.144) -0.207 (0.158) -0.253 (0.116) -0.255 (0.124) -0.153 (0.147) -0.205 (0.15)
Incumbent is (shadow)
cabinet member -0.08 (0.187) -0.069 (0.203) 0.028 (0.154) -0.076 (0.156) -0.088 (0.19) -0.025 (0.194)
Constituency support for
Brexit in 2014 -0.146 (0.22) -0.047 (0.254) -0.179 (0.163) -0.233 (0.165) -0.178 (0.226) -0.044 (0.235)
East of England 0.018 (0.231) -0.152 (0.239) 0.084 (0.165) 0.066 (0.166) -0.084 (0.217) -0.169 (0.218)
London 0.309 (0.333) 0.033 (0.361) -0.051 (0.262) -0.105 (0.267) 0.128 (0.305) 0.05 (0.324)
North East 0.073 (0.494) -0.168 (0.504) -0.144 (0.419) -0.491 (0.421) -0.065 (0.431) -0.207 (0.442)
North West 0.22 (0.242) 0.24 (0.256) -0.117 (0.204) -0.079 (0.205) 0.232 (0.237) 0.278 (0.24)
Scotland 1.466 (0.696) 1.437 (0.728) 0.177 (0.62) 0.249 (0.631) 1.02 (0.607) 1.076 (0.617)
South East 0.013 (0.213) -0.031 (0.224) -0.158 (0.173) 0.034 (0.169) 0.042 (0.192) -0.013 (0.203)
South West 0.512 (0.219) 0.345 (0.234) 0.075 (0.176) -0.007 (0.169) 0.378 (0.212) 0.343 (0.211)
Wales 0.215 (0.351) 0.168 (0.394) -0.045 (0.278) -0.079 (0.271) 0.149 (0.336) 0.086 (0.35)
West Midlands 0.338 (0.261) 0.198 (0.244) 0.141 (0.188) 0.091 (0.178) 0.241 (0.212) 0.172 (0.212)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.298 (0.261) 0.128 (0.274) -0.237 (0.214) -0.23 (0.224) 0.109 (0.243) 0.045 (0.242)
R propensity to vote Cons. 1.878 (0.068) 1.713 (0.081) 1.45 (0.063) 1.421 (0.067) 1.759 (0.069) 1.745 (0.072)







TABLE S7. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position.
Conservative seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Labour -0.598 (0.068) -0.956 (0.066) -0.496 (0.048) -0.804 (0.06) -0.717 (0.065) -0.868 (0.072)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.195 (0.049) -0.392 (0.05) -0.196 (0.056) -0.202 (0.059) -0.317 (0.055) -0.38 (0.053)
R propensity to vote UKIP 0.366 (0.068) 0.606 (0.081) 0.702 (0.053) 0.378 (0.056) 0.49 (0.077) 0.551 (0.083)
R propensity to vote Green -0.411 (0.07) -0.448 (0.061) -0.416 (0.055) -0.359 (0.053) -0.406 (0.064) -0.442 (0.063)
Perceived MP support for
Brexit -0.03 (0.038) -0.106 (0.039) 0.197 (0.033) 0.221 (0.038) 0.074 (0.033) 0.062 (0.027)
sd__(Intercept) 0.518 (0.058) 0.474 (0.084) 0.447 (0.045) 0.267 (0.08) 0.329 (0.047) 0.27 (0.055)
R did not vote in 2016 -1.978 (0.316) -0.914 (0.416)
R voted Leave in 2016 1.023 (0.22) 1.01 (0.233)
Perceived congruence 0.154 (0.027) 0.195 (0.03)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 0.189 (0.333) 0.878 (0.482)
Cons. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.171 (0.215) -0.231 (0.241)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.468 (0.269) -0.481 (0.429)
Lab. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.438 (0.16) -0.386 (0.181)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 0.057 (0.211) 0.045 (0.268)
UKIP share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.379 (0.117) -0.303 (0.129)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not











TABLE S7. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position.
Conservative seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.011 (0.119) -0.018 (0.133)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.029 (0.366) 0.031 (0.498)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.381 (0.275) -0.278 (0.284)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not
vote in 2016 0.089 (0.299) 0.177 (0.399)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.048 (0.2) -0.235 (0.218)
Pct. unemployed by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.033 (0.326) 0.24 (0.45)
Pct. unemployed by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.154 (0.182) -0.096 (0.207)
Import shock by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.019 (0.121) -0.174 (0.165)
Import shock by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.221 (0.077) -0.16 (0.082)
Two-term incumbent by R did
not vote in 2016 0.628 (0.235) 0.814 (0.328)
Three+ term incumbent by R
did not vote in 2016 -0.011 (0.256) 0.043 (0.341)
Two-term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.161 (0.162) 0.181 (0.181)
Three+ term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.097 (0.169) -0.039 (0.185)
Cabinet member by R did not
vote in 2016 0.115 (0.412) -0.175 (0.414)
Cabinet member by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.065 (0.211) 0.005 (0.232)
2014 support for Brexit by R
did not vote in 2016 -0.018 (0.35) 0.001 (0.479)







TABLE S7. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position.
Conservative seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
2014 support for Brexit by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.124 (0.248) -0.24 (0.27)
East of England by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.027 (0.325) 0.103 (0.442)
London by R did not vote in
2016 0.342 (0.49) -0.331 (0.568)
North East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.197 (0.742) -0.435 (0.784)
North West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.098 (0.414) -0.137 (0.512)
Scotland by R did not vote in
2016 0.033 (0.924) 0.239 (1.002)
South East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.463 (0.336) -0.091 (0.434)
South West by R did not vote
in 2016 0.16 (0.388) -0.158 (0.462)
Wales by R did not vote in
2016 -0.108 (0.585) 0.056 (0.757)
West Midlands by R did not
vote in 2016 0.319 (0.38) -0.155 (0.5)
Yorks. by R did not vote in
2016 0.009 (0.442) 0.527 (0.555)
East of England by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.118 (0.238) 0.257 (0.249)
London by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.419 (0.357) -0.089 (0.393)
North East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.347 (0.51) -0.29 (0.545)
North West by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.424 (0.265) -0.316 (0.291)
Scotland by R voted Leave in











TABLE S7. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position.
Conservative seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
South East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.191 (0.216) 0.074 (0.232)
South West by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.545 (0.229) -0.396 (0.249)
Wales by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.342 (0.381) -0.3 (0.399)
West Midlands by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.156 (0.239) -0.024 (0.253)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.656 (0.277) -0.399 (0.294)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.275 (0.177) -0.122 (0.222)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.379 (0.086) -0.336 (0.087)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in
2016 0.283 (0.214) -0.361 (0.223)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.188 (0.087) 0.107 (0.107)
PTV LibDem by R did not
vote in 2016 0.095 (0.189) 0.033 (0.184)
PTV LibDem by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.131 (0.07) 0.193 (0.083)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote
in 2016 0.132 (0.143) 0.261 (0.218)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.165 (0.088) -0.314 (0.092)
PTV Green by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.119 (0.2) 0.001 (0.221)
PTV Green by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.091 (0.103) 0.101 (0.08)
Number of obs. 7941 7017 8997 7830 15819 14351







TABLE S7. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position.
Conservative seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Number of groups 315 315 315 315 315 315











TABLE S8. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. Labour
seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election.
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
(Intercept) -0.792 (0.296) 0.835 (0.316) -1.847 (0.313) -0.878 (0.378) 0.002 (0.27) 0.54 (0.296)
Conservative share 2015 0.174 (0.185) 0.476 (0.206) -0.052 (0.211) 0.021 (0.253) 0.316 (0.187) 0.497 (0.201)
Labour share 2015 0.428 (0.22) 0.623 (0.253) 0.388 (0.229) 0.448 (0.274) 0.317 (0.24) 0.504 (0.251)
UKIP share 2015 -0.09 (0.12) 0.169 (0.145) -0.116 (0.125) 0.048 (0.147) 0.17 (0.138) 0.187 (0.148)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011
census 0.064 (0.075) 0.036 (0.081) 0.073 (0.081) 0.008 (0.094) 0.001 (0.077) 0.037 (0.086)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications
of greater, 2011 census 0.154 (0.257) -0.048 (0.299) 0.132 (0.274) 0.132 (0.328) -0.154 (0.259) -0.181 (0.29)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census -0.126 (0.108) 0.062 (0.127) -0.224 (0.111) -0.048 (0.134) 0.059 (0.112) 0.037 (0.126)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011
census -0.047 (0.119) -0.141 (0.135) -0.033 (0.119) -0.045 (0.137) -0.087 (0.131) -0.131 (0.142)
Import shock 0.075 (0.067) 0.097 (0.08) 0.075 (0.074) 0.079 (0.089) 0.069 (0.073) 0.043 (0.079)
Incumbent has served two
terms -0.354 (0.189) -0.48 (0.214) -0.12 (0.196) -0.108 (0.23) -0.507 (0.189) -0.502 (0.211)
Incumbent has served three
or more terms -0.227 (0.166) -0.36 (0.188) 0.027 (0.178) 0.012 (0.205) -0.234 (0.174) -0.285 (0.185)
Incumbent is (shadow)
cabinet member -0.226 (0.194) -0.258 (0.213) -0.283 (0.196) -0.217 (0.234) -0.148 (0.2) -0.294 (0.22)
Constituency support for
Brexit in 2014 0.158 (0.248) -0.083 (0.288) 0.193 (0.258) 0.052 (0.3) -0.181 (0.252) -0.118 (0.28)
East of England -0.401 (0.458) -0.513 (0.47) 0.156 (0.452) 0.161 (0.501) -0.427 (0.415) -0.399 (0.445)
London 0.102 (0.341) -0.038 (0.361) 0.269 (0.359) -0.024 (0.402) 0.036 (0.342) 0.164 (0.353)
North East 0.014 (0.326) 0.174 (0.335) -0.384 (0.31) -0.143 (0.333) 0.171 (0.3) 0.155 (0.322)
North West 0.003 (0.268) 0.246 (0.281) -0.224 (0.266) -0.064 (0.285) 0.116 (0.262) 0.292 (0.279)
Scotland -0.162 (0.646) 0.176 (0.648) -0.114 (0.701) 0.386 (0.775) 0.411 (0.608) 0.438 (0.627)
South East 0.327 (0.551) -0.068 (0.558) -0.624 (0.608) -0.91 (0.689) 0.408 (0.511) 0.038 (0.534)
South West 0.269 (0.449) 0.432 (0.459) -0.623 (0.499) -0.332 (0.578) 0.359 (0.411) 0.435 (0.441)
Wales 0.178 (0.304) -0.01 (0.317) -0.209 (0.318) -0.276 (0.351) -0.089 (0.292) -0.062 (0.319)
West Midlands 0.019 (0.308) 0.036 (0.318) -0.064 (0.307) -0.088 (0.349) 0.05 (0.302) 0.13 (0.313)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.119 (0.272) 0.016 (0.294) 0.014 (0.285) 0.062 (0.302) 0.11 (0.267) 0.109 (0.283)
R propensity to vote Cons. -0.604 (0.059) -1.059 (0.087) -0.752 (0.062) -1.136 (0.092) -0.83 (0.084) -0.99 (0.089)







TABLE S8. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. Labour
seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Labour 1.697 (0.096) 1.609 (0.095) 1.461 (0.094) 1.415 (0.093) 1.554 (0.079) 1.648 (0.112)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.18 (0.061) -0.456 (0.07) -0.102 (0.061) -0.126 (0.105) -0.397 (0.072) -0.486 (0.07)
R propensity to vote UKIP -0.461 (0.079) -0.235 (0.136) -0.093 (0.055) -0.617 (0.073) -0.292 (0.088) -0.248 (0.113)
R propensity to vote Green 0.261 (0.075) 0.197 (0.07) 0.164 (0.077) 0.32 (0.083) 0.212 (0.089) 0.196 (0.075)
Perceived MP support for
Brexit -0.024 (0.046) -0.092 (0.052) 0.113 (0.039) 0.13 (0.052) 0.026 (0.031) -0.01 (0.039)
sd__(Intercept) 0.616 (0.06) 0.583 (0.084) 0.684 (0.06) 0.747 (0.082) 0.522 (0.046) 0.539 (0.056)
R did not vote in 2016 -1.904 (0.371) -0.477 (0.498)
R voted Leave in 2016 -1.137 (0.289) -1.129 (0.326)
Perceived congruence 0.111 (0.041) 0.13 (0.039)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.272 (0.257) -0.231 (0.437)
Cons. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.4 (0.23) -0.471 (0.255)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 0.207 (0.289) 0.407 (0.48)
Lab. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.143 (0.277) -0.21 (0.292)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.435 (0.171) 0.044 (0.269)
UKIP share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.201 (0.148) -0.154 (0.165)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not











TABLE S8. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. Labour
seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.048 (0.096) -0.114 (0.103)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did
not vote in 2016 0.665 (0.343) 1.118 (0.501)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.078 (0.299) 0.125 (0.328)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.264 (0.141) 0.077 (0.251)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.271 (0.13) -0.173 (0.14)
Pct. unemployed by R did
not vote in 2016 0.253 (0.169) 0.202 (0.243)
Pct. unemployed by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.037 (0.145) 0.065 (0.161)
Import shock by R did not
vote in 2016 0.073 (0.095) 0.363 (0.192)
Import shock by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.081 (0.083) -0.039 (0.094)
Two-term incumbent by R did
not vote in 2016 0.153 (0.263) 0.287 (0.492)
Three+ term incumbent by R
did not vote in 2016 0.077 (0.214) -0.108 (0.364)
Two-term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.532 (0.22) 0.434 (0.25)
Three+ term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.392 (0.196) 0.364 (0.219)
Cabinet member by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.072 (0.251) 0.513 (0.531)
Cabinet member by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.226 (0.263) -0.008 (0.273)
2014 support for Brexit by R
did not vote in 2016 0.63 (0.325) 0.392 (0.502)







TABLE S8. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. Labour
seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
2014 support for Brexit by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.19 (0.283) 0.109 (0.317)
East of England by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.377 (0.632) 0.381 (0.787)
London by R did not vote in
2016 -0.225 (0.399) -0.535 (0.652)
North East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.63 (0.422) 0.793 (0.672)
North West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.355 (0.34) 0.341 (0.513)
Scotland by R did not vote in
2016 -1.201 (0.689) -1.116 (0.876)
South East by R did not vote
in 2016 -1.186 (0.652) -2.08 (0.828)
South West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.915 (0.557) -0.094 (0.752)
Wales by R did not vote in
2016 0.433 (0.459) 0.75 (0.588)
West Midlands by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.304 (0.354) -0.414 (0.572)
Yorks. by R did not vote in
2016 -0.288 (0.333) -0.112 (0.484)
East of England by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.828 (0.452) 0.754 (0.478)
London by R voted Leave in
2016 0.45 (0.384) -0.004 (0.424)
North East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.637 (0.31) -0.446 (0.348)
North West by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.34 (0.282) -0.44 (0.314)
Scotland by R voted Leave in











TABLE S8. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. Labour
seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
South East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.767 (0.613) -0.282 (0.663)
South West by R voted
Leave in 2016 -1.049 (0.506) -0.909 (0.555)
Wales by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.42 (0.315) -0.367 (0.346)
West Midlands by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.012 (0.323) -0.179 (0.355)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.047 (0.277) 0.043 (0.315)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote
in 2016 0.176 (0.131) -0.571 (0.268)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.011 (0.103) -0.037 (0.107)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in
2016 -0.127 (0.176) 0.046 (0.284)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.142 (0.1) -0.238 (0.112)
PTV LibDem by R did not
vote in 2016 0.375 (0.095) 0.298 (0.258)
PTV LibDem by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.29 (0.119) 0.341 (0.118)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote
in 2016 0.14 (0.139) -0.254 (0.365)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.028 (0.11) -0.188 (0.137)
PTV Green by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.109 (0.1) 0.219 (0.235)
PTV Green by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.028 (0.1) 0.063 (0.125)
Number of obs. 5420 4728 4863 3984 9370 8322







TABLE S8. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. Labour
seats only. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Number of groups 209 209 209 209 209 209











TABLE S9. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. All
seats. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election.
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
(Intercept) -1.947 (0.227) -0.696 (0.24) -1.595 (0.201) -0.757 (0.217) -1.065 (0.193) -0.708 (0.191)
Conservative share 2015 0.532 (0.207) 0.749 (0.209) 0.381 (0.164) 0.527 (0.18) 0.46 (0.162) 0.544 (0.167)
Labour share 2015 0.282 (0.161) 0.408 (0.17) -0.009 (0.125) 0.093 (0.133) 0.499 (0.128) 0.608 (0.144)
UKIP share 2015 0.105 (0.115) 0.148 (0.131) -0.164 (0.088) -0.15 (0.094) 0.202 (0.093) 0.157 (0.102)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011
census -0.015 (0.121) 0.003 (0.12) -0.033 (0.095) -0.026 (0.104) -0.029 (0.086) 0.011 (0.09)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications
of greater, 2011 census -0.041 (0.234) -0.108 (0.252) -0.329 (0.193) -0.33 (0.208) -0.158 (0.206) -0.155 (0.218)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census 0.029 (0.166) 0.142 (0.182) -0.003 (0.149) -0.064 (0.157) 0.164 (0.132) 0.101 (0.145)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011
census -0.027 (0.162) -0.093 (0.173) -0.133 (0.149) -0.17 (0.155) -0.137 (0.125) -0.207 (0.135)
Import shock 0.103 (0.073) 0.043 (0.077) -0.059 (0.058) -0.076 (0.062) 0.063 (0.062) 0.05 (0.067)
Incumbent has served two
terms -0.12 (0.149) -0.206 (0.158) -0.035 (0.117) -0.068 (0.127) -0.405 (0.125) -0.469 (0.135)
Incumbent has served three
or more terms -0.191 (0.148) -0.219 (0.159) -0.25 (0.126) -0.249 (0.139) -0.26 (0.129) -0.285 (0.139)
Incumbent is (shadow)
cabinet member -0.068 (0.19) -0.067 (0.21) 0.022 (0.166) -0.09 (0.176) 0.009 (0.167) -0.066 (0.174)
Constituency support for
Brexit in 2014 -0.115 (0.214) -0.038 (0.241) -0.147 (0.175) -0.185 (0.186) -0.218 (0.193) -0.084 (0.206)
East of England -0.03 (0.22) -0.19 (0.229) 0.074 (0.17) 0.055 (0.185) -0.138 (0.206) -0.201 (0.211)
London 0.256 (0.318) -0.007 (0.337) -0.049 (0.274) -0.13 (0.29) -0.085 (0.274) 0.038 (0.292)
North East 0.046 (0.46) -0.114 (0.465) -0.181 (0.407) -0.429 (0.423) 0.247 (0.371) -0.031 (0.376)
North West 0.17 (0.24) 0.206 (0.255) -0.138 (0.213) -0.091 (0.227) 0.305 (0.214) 0.349 (0.229)
Scotland 1.048 (0.628) 1.163 (0.64) 0.088 (0.582) 0.336 (0.607) 0.852 (0.557) 0.959 (0.563)
South East -0.023 (0.205) -0.059 (0.216) -0.181 (0.179) 0.005 (0.186) 0.017 (0.183) 0.012 (0.2)
South West 0.462 (0.212) 0.312 (0.227) 0.048 (0.179) -0.028 (0.187) 0.423 (0.201) 0.383 (0.209)
Wales 0.166 (0.343) 0.124 (0.364) -0.067 (0.285) -0.081 (0.292) 0.309 (0.282) 0.271 (0.301)
West Midlands 0.293 (0.245) 0.165 (0.236) 0.126 (0.191) 0.08 (0.195) 0.326 (0.196) 0.276 (0.202)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.245 (0.255) 0.091 (0.265) -0.246 (0.222) -0.238 (0.244) 0.022 (0.218) -0.019 (0.225)
R propensity to vote Cons. 1.884 (0.068) 1.716 (0.082) 1.462 (0.063) 1.443 (0.068) 1.612 (0.055) 1.68 (0.066)







TABLE S9. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. All
seats. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Labour -0.596 (0.068) -0.954 (0.067) -0.498 (0.047) -0.812 (0.061) -0.625 (0.051) -0.809 (0.059)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.199 (0.05) -0.394 (0.05) -0.198 (0.057) -0.203 (0.059) -0.365 (0.051) -0.417 (0.051)
R propensity to vote UKIP 0.368 (0.068) 0.607 (0.08) 0.704 (0.054) 0.383 (0.057) 0.459 (0.061) 0.569 (0.062)
R propensity to vote Green -0.414 (0.071) -0.452 (0.059) -0.418 (0.055) -0.362 (0.053) -0.407 (0.054) -0.458 (0.061)
Labour incumbent 1.022 (0.302) 1.405 (0.313) -0.307 (0.297) -0.166 (0.314) 0.345 (0.253) 0.408 (0.249)
Perceived MP support for
Brexit -0.028 (0.033) -0.102 (0.033) 0.168 (0.029) 0.188 (0.031) 0.057 (0.026) 0.038 (0.021)
Conservative share 2015,
Labour inc. -0.319 (0.252) -0.216 (0.273) -0.409 (0.25) -0.449 (0.271) -0.291 (0.198) -0.231 (0.206)
Labour share 2015, Labour
inc. 0.205 (0.271) 0.308 (0.3) 0.4 (0.242) 0.388 (0.264) 0.183 (0.202) 0.246 (0.225)
UKIP share 2015, Labour
inc. -0.173 (0.168) 0.055 (0.195) 0.043 (0.138) 0.204 (0.154) 0.054 (0.124) 0.15 (0.133)
Pct. aged 18-24, Labour inc. 0.085 (0.143) 0.041 (0.137) 0.102 (0.12) 0.032 (0.128) 0.061 (0.095) 0.046 (0.099)
Pct. w/ Level 4 quals or
greater, Labour inc. 0.189 (0.322) 0.053 (0.365) 0.439 (0.301) 0.447 (0.329) 0.271 (0.247) 0.244 (0.273)
Pct. non-white, Labour inc. -0.154 (0.19) -0.076 (0.221) -0.22 (0.174) 0.01 (0.184) -0.138 (0.139) -0.067 (0.157)
Pct. unempoyed, Labour inc. -0.02 (0.204) -0.048 (0.218) 0.1 (0.182) 0.137 (0.185) 0.051 (0.142) 0.084 (0.149)
Import shock, Labour inc. -0.017 (0.096) 0.061 (0.102) 0.123 (0.087) 0.145 (0.094) 0.034 (0.071) 0.037 (0.077)
Labour incumbent has
served two terms -0.229 (0.225) -0.286 (0.255) -0.085 (0.205) -0.034 (0.225) -0.125 (0.167) -0.081 (0.181)
Labour incumbent has











TABLE S9. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. All
seats. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Labour incumbent is
(shadow) cabinet member -0.162 (0.265) -0.205 (0.292) -0.303 (0.236) -0.143 (0.252) -0.22 (0.192) -0.23 (0.199)
Const’y support for Brexit in
2014, Labour inc. 0.26 (0.313) -0.065 (0.339) 0.317 (0.28) 0.2 (0.301) 0.213 (0.231) 0.13 (0.249)
East of England, Labour inc. -0.237 (0.483) -0.204 (0.476) 0.056 (0.426) 0.069 (0.446) -0.074 (0.352) 0.041 (0.366)
London, Labour inc. -0.029 (0.425) 0.072 (0.452) 0.292 (0.394) 0.044 (0.415) 0.199 (0.344) 0.149 (0.355)
North East, Labour inc. 0.072 (0.517) 0.381 (0.513) -0.255 (0.473) 0.198 (0.478) 0.053 (0.397) 0.325 (0.42)
North West, Labour inc. -0.059 (0.337) 0.136 (0.343) -0.142 (0.301) -0.051 (0.314) -0.11 (0.249) -0.011 (0.262)
Scotland, Labour inc. -0.741 (0.731) -0.433 (0.741) -0.213 (0.732) 0.232 (0.771) 0.147 (0.668) 0.152 (0.668)
South East, Labour inc. 0.452 (0.537) 0.073 (0.557) -0.57 (0.581) -1.052 (0.639) 0.226 (0.45) 0.034 (0.477)
South West, Labour inc. -0.003 (0.46) 0.301 (0.471) -0.727 (0.469) -0.315 (0.523) -0.118 (0.367) 0.168 (0.381)
Wales, Labour inc. 0.148 (0.413) 0.017 (0.444) -0.174 (0.374) -0.215 (0.395) -0.14 (0.314) -0.121 (0.333)
West Midlands, Labour inc. -0.164 (0.39) -0.032 (0.36) -0.236 (0.331) -0.24 (0.342) -0.228 (0.285) -0.166 (0.282)
Yorkshire and the Humber,
Labour inc. -0.014 (0.342) 0.034 (0.356) 0.209 (0.311) 0.224 (0.322) 0.281 (0.269) 0.259 (0.275)
R propensity to vote Cons.,
Labour inc. -2.48 (0.096) -2.762 (0.142) -2.199 (0.095) -2.537 (0.13) -2.327 (0.089) -2.591 (0.108)
R propensity to vote Labour,
Labour inc. 2.284 (0.12) 2.551 (0.122) 1.939 (0.115) 2.18 (0.124) 2.044 (0.085) 2.326 (0.098)
R propensity to vote Lib Dem,
Labour inc. 0.019 (0.079) -0.059 (0.088) 0.098 (0.092) 0.077 (0.142) 0.047 (0.07) 0.008 (0.088)
R propensity to vote UKIP,
Labour inc. -0.828 (0.077) -0.84 (0.141) -0.795 (0.071) -0.978 (0.073) -0.739 (0.051) -0.848 (0.063)







TABLE S9. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. All
seats. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
R propensity to vote Green,
Labour inc. 0.675 (0.095) 0.647 (0.085) 0.577 (0.073) 0.665 (0.103) 0.618 (0.066) 0.66 (0.073)
sd__(Intercept) 0.572 (0.042) 0.533 (0.058) 0.541 (0.036) 0.481 (0.051) 0.42 (0.033) 0.392 (0.035)
R did not vote in 2016 -1.643 (0.229) -0.195 (0.281)
R voted Leave in 2016 0.293 (0.172) 0.352 (0.18)
Perceived congruence 0.161 (0.026) 0.197 (0.025)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.189 (0.18) -0.258 (0.224)
Cons. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.006 (0.124) 0.015 (0.139)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.351 (0.185) -0.143 (0.232)
Lab. share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.624 (0.126) -0.682 (0.137)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did
not vote in 2016 -0.338 (0.12) 0.083 (0.17)
UKIP share in 2015 by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.416 (0.086) -0.361 (0.097)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not
vote in 2016 0.189 (0.078) 0.172 (0.135)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.085 (0.066) -0.131 (0.073)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did
not vote in 2016 0.181 (0.245) 0.585 (0.341)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.309 (0.195) -0.282 (0.21)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not











TABLE S9. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. All
seats. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.223 (0.097) -0.198 (0.109)
Pct. unemployed by R did
not vote in 2016 0.159 (0.147) 0.128 (0.185)
Pct. unemployed by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.034 (0.104) 0.039 (0.123)
Import shock by R did not
vote in 2016 0.025 (0.075) 0.043 (0.11)
Import shock by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.167 (0.054) -0.115 (0.061)
Two-term incumbent by R did
not vote in 2016 0.449 (0.182) 0.796 (0.239)
Three+ term incumbent by R
did not vote in 2016 0.12 (0.169) 0.143 (0.22)
Two-term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.439 (0.121) 0.445 (0.138)
Three+ term incumbent by R
voted Leave in 2016 0.067 (0.118) 0.077 (0.134)
Cabinet member by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.015 (0.206) 0.103 (0.313)
Cabinet member by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.084 (0.167) 0.018 (0.184)
2014 support for Brexit by R
did not vote in 2016 0.256 (0.237) 0.267 (0.361)
2014 support for Brexit by R
voted Leave in 2016 -0.051 (0.183) -0.175 (0.203)
East of England by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.086 (0.29) 0.171 (0.362)
London by R did not vote in
2016 0.194 (0.309) -0.155 (0.401)
North East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.642 (0.335) 0.281 (0.469)







TABLE S9. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. All
seats. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
North West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.271 (0.286) -0.091 (0.385)
Scotland by R did not vote in
2016 -1.254 (0.665) -0.666 (0.803)
South East by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.519 (0.283) -0.05 (0.364)
South West by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.237 (0.304) -0.154 (0.393)
Wales by R did not vote in
2016 0.125 (0.364) 0.43 (0.454)
West Midlands by R did not
vote in 2016 -0.046 (0.266) -0.244 (0.394)
Yorks. by R did not vote in
2016 -0.33 (0.257) -0.186 (0.353)
East of England by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.213 (0.21) 0.284 (0.23)
London by R voted Leave in
2016 0.015 (0.26) -0.047 (0.288)
North East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.915 (0.247) -0.703 (0.282)
North West by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.58 (0.195) -0.512 (0.22)
Scotland by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.647 (0.588) -0.506 (0.624)
South East by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.158 (0.193) 0.034 (0.213)
South West by R voted
Leave in 2016 -0.596 (0.201) -0.457 (0.228)
Wales by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.647 (0.234) -0.561 (0.269)
West Midlands by R voted











TABLE S9. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice using perceptions of MP position. All
seats. Models with (*) are estimated only on those who voted in the 2017 general election. (cont.)
Term Voted Remain Voted Remain(*) Voted Leave Voted Leave(*) All All(*)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in
2016 -0.468 (0.199) -0.222 (0.226)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.042 (0.108) -0.308 (0.118)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.173 (0.067) -0.209 (0.071)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in
2016 0.048 (0.139) -0.224 (0.154)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.04 (0.061) -0.016 (0.076)
PTV LibDem by R did not
vote in 2016 0.252 (0.091) 0.144 (0.111)
PTV LibDem by R voted
Leave in 2016 0.191 (0.055) 0.241 (0.063)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote
in 2016 0.121 (0.104) 0.005 (0.182)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave
in 2016 -0.077 (0.056) -0.274 (0.064)
PTV Green by R did not vote
in 2016 -0.097 (0.104) 0.099 (0.123)
PTV Green by R voted Leave
in 2016 0.068 (0.083) 0.092 (0.079)
Number of obs. 13361 11745 13860 11814 25189 22673
Number of groups 524 524 524 524 524 524
SD, random area intercept 0.572 0.533 0.541 0.481 0.42 0.392







TABLE S10. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice, Conservative seats only, using Heppell
scores.
Term No Heppell With Heppell
(Intercept) -1.444 (0.207) -1.605 (0.218)
Conservative share 2015 0.262 (0.238) 0.213 (0.239)
Labour share 2015 0.235 (0.183) 0.225 (0.184)
UKIP share 2015 0.006 (0.128) -0.012 (0.127)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011 census -0.159 (0.12) -0.171 (0.118)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications of greater, 2011 census -0.229 (0.23) -0.213 (0.23)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census 0.082 (0.167) 0.045 (0.17)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011 census -0.021 (0.165) -0.023 (0.164)
Import shock 0.072 (0.071) 0.068 (0.074)
Incumbent has served three or more terms 0.074 (0.115) 0.163 (0.125)
Incumbent is (shadow) cabinet member -0.144 (0.177) -0.059 (0.182)
Constituency support for Brexit in 2014 -0.182 (0.21) -0.143 (0.212)
East of England -0.365 (0.217) -0.363 (0.217)
London 0.273 (0.324) 0.314 (0.327)
North East 0.223 (0.435) 0.233 (0.448)
North West 0.37 (0.243) 0.372 (0.243)
Scotland 1.218 (0.563) 1.184 (0.566)
South East 0.026 (0.207) 0.052 (0.208)
South West 0.205 (0.209) 0.149 (0.208)
Wales 0.229 (0.315) 0.22 (0.315)
West Midlands 0.07 (0.214) 0.126 (0.216)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.197 (0.246) 0.188 (0.241)
R propensity to vote Cons. 1.714 (0.071) 1.727 (0.072)











TABLE S10. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice, Conservative seats only, using Heppell
scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.339 (0.056) -0.34 (0.056)
R propensity to vote UKIP 0.481 (0.085) 0.485 (0.085)
R propensity to vote Green -0.349 (0.06) -0.346 (0.06)
R did not vote in 2016 -1.074 (0.386) -0.912 (0.404)
R voted Leave in 2016 1.101 (0.232) 1.303 (0.244)
Incumbent campaigned to Remain in 2016 0.007 (0.071) 0 (0.08)
Incumbent undeclared in 2016 -0.025 (0.207) -0.023 (0.212)
Congruence 0.042 (0.068) 0.023 (0.075)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did not vote in 2016 0.266 (0.508) 0.349 (0.518)
Cons. share in 2015 by R voted Leave in 2016 0.076 (0.279) 0.132 (0.284)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did not vote in 2016 -0.41 (0.435) -0.429 (0.437)
Lab. share in 2015 by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.321 (0.219) -0.308 (0.222)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did not vote in 2016 -0.129 (0.293) -0.15 (0.294)
UKIP share in 2015 by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.231 (0.149) -0.203 (0.149)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not vote in 2016 0.244 (0.283) 0.282 (0.286)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted Leave in 2016 0.169 (0.139) 0.185 (0.139)







TABLE S10. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice, Conservative seats only, using Heppell
scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did not vote in 2016 0.017 (0.478) -0.01 (0.486)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.228 (0.285) -0.238 (0.285)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not vote in 2016 -0.455 (0.375) -0.453 (0.37)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted Leave in 2016 0.011 (0.208) 0.058 (0.212)
Pct. unemployed by R did not vote in 2016 0.19 (0.399) 0.215 (0.401)
Pct. unemployed by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.121 (0.209) -0.117 (0.207)
Import shock by R did not vote in 2016 0.028 (0.161) 0.034 (0.166)
Import shock by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.142 (0.083) -0.136 (0.086)
Three+ term incumbent by R did not vote in 2016 -0.337 (0.282) -0.474 (0.292)
Three+ term incumbent by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.123 (0.14) -0.227 (0.15)
Cabinet member by R did not vote in 2016 0.289 (0.425) 0.2 (0.434)
Cabinet member by R voted Leave in 2016 0.173 (0.213) 0.076 (0.217)
2014 support for Brexit by R did not vote in 2016 0.183 (0.443) 0.176 (0.45)
2014 support for Brexit by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.033 (0.247) -0.077 (0.248)
East of England by R did not vote in 2016 0.035 (0.414) 0.057 (0.416)











TABLE S10. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice, Conservative seats only, using Heppell
scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
North East by R did not vote in 2016 -0.2 (0.823) -0.199 (0.826)
North West by R did not vote in 2016 -0.464 (0.525) -0.438 (0.535)
Scotland by R did not vote in 2016 0.573 (0.913) 0.566 (0.922)
South East by R did not vote in 2016 -0.403 (0.409) -0.416 (0.41)
South West by R did not vote in 2016 0.009 (0.432) 0.068 (0.431)
Wales by R did not vote in 2016 -0.451 (0.67) -0.443 (0.672)
West Midlands by R did not vote in 2016 0.21 (0.43) 0.154 (0.436)
Yorks. by R did not vote in 2016 0.017 (0.539) 0.078 (0.55)
East of England by R voted Leave in 2016 0.209 (0.249) 0.213 (0.249)
London by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.577 (0.388) -0.629 (0.39)
North East by R voted Leave in 2016 0.249 (0.577) 0.245 (0.578)
North West by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.269 (0.287) -0.266 (0.291)
Scotland by R voted Leave in 2016 -1.19 (0.656) -1.144 (0.667)
South East by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.152 (0.243) -0.18 (0.242)
South West by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.286 (0.248) -0.217 (0.245)
Wales by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.272 (0.372) -0.256 (0.372)







TABLE S10. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice, Conservative seats only, using Heppell
scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
West Midlands by R voted Leave in 2016 0.034 (0.257) -0.033 (0.26)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.345 (0.29) -0.335 (0.288)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote in 2016 -0.347 (0.188) -0.348 (0.187)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.28 (0.092) -0.292 (0.092)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in 2016 0.178 (0.226) 0.171 (0.231)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave in 2016 0.147 (0.095) 0.151 (0.095)
PTV LibDem by R did not vote in 2016 0.188 (0.199) 0.187 (0.203)
PTV LibDem by R voted Leave in 2016 0.166 (0.07) 0.168 (0.07)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote in 2016 0.1 (0.197) 0.104 (0.198)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.257 (0.097) -0.26 (0.097)
PTV Green by R did not vote in 2016 -0.091 (0.226) -0.088 (0.226)
PTV Green by R voted Leave in 2016 0.065 (0.085) 0.062 (0.084)
sd__(Intercept) 0.191 (0.062) 0.194 (0.062)
Heppell: Europhile (cat. 1) 0.705 (0.356)
Heppell: Agnostic (cat. 2) 0.326 (0.144)











TABLE S10. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote choice, Conservative seats only, using Heppell
scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
R did not vote in 2016 by Heppell cat. 1 0.09 (0.731)
R voted Leave in 2016 by Heppell cat. 1 -0.904 (0.416)
R did not vote in 2016 by Heppell cat. 2 -0.484 (0.352)
R voted Leave in 2016 by Heppell cat. 2 -0.387 (0.172)
R did not vote in 2016 by Heppell cat. 4 -0.259 (0.321)
R voted Leave in 2016 by Heppell cat. 4 -0.152 (0.166)
Number of obs. 11857 11857
Number of groups 238 238
SD, random area intercept 0.191 0.194







TABLE S11. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of perception of MP Brexit stance, Conservative seats only, using
Heppell scores.
Term No Heppell With Heppell
(Intercept) 3.626 (0.104) 3.633 (0.108)
Conservative share 2015 0.062 (0.113) 0.054 (0.112)
Labour share 2015 -0.188 (0.079) -0.182 (0.08)
UKIP share 2015 0.002 (0.053) 0.017 (0.054)
Pct. aged 18-24, 2011 census -0.013 (0.048) -0.014 (0.048)
Pct. w/ Level 4 qualifications of greater, 2011 census -0.162 (0.118) -0.152 (0.119)
Pct. non-white, 2011 census 0.071 (0.073) 0.09 (0.073)
Pct. unempoyed, 2011 census 0.022 (0.068) 0.019 (0.067)
Import shock 0.022 (0.03) 0.016 (0.03)
Incumbent has served three or more terms 0.038 (0.046) 0.033 (0.047)
Incumbent is (shadow) cabinet member 0.107 (0.078) 0.098 (0.078)
Constituency support for Brexit in 2014 -0.055 (0.097) -0.059 (0.098)
East of England 0.05 (0.097) 0.045 (0.097)
London 0.198 (0.154) 0.154 (0.155)
North East 0.307 (0.223) 0.326 (0.226)
North West 0.354 (0.114) 0.355 (0.116)
Scotland 0.244 (0.312) 0.273 (0.303)
South East 0.099 (0.1) 0.087 (0.1)
South West 0.157 (0.103) 0.167 (0.103)
Wales 0.247 (0.144) 0.248 (0.142)
West Midlands 0.191 (0.113) 0.174 (0.112)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.356 (0.113) 0.334 (0.114)
R propensity to vote Cons. -0.091 (0.028) -0.092 (0.028)











TABLE S11. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of perception of MP Brexit stance, Conservative seats only, using
Heppell scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
R propensity to vote Lib Dem -0.022 (0.021) -0.022 (0.021)
R propensity to vote UKIP -0.018 (0.035) -0.018 (0.035)
R propensity to vote Green 0.026 (0.021) 0.027 (0.021)
R did not vote in 2016 -0.156 (0.224) -0.162 (0.226)
R voted Leave in 2016 -0.136 (0.117) -0.137 (0.118)
Incumbent campaigned to Remain in 2016 -0.637 (0.038) -0.604 (0.042)
Incumbent undeclared in 2016 -0.412 (0.105) -0.408 (0.105)
Congruence 0.077 (0.03) 0.077 (0.03)
Cons. share in 2015 by R did not vote in 2016 -0.088 (0.279) -0.094 (0.278)
Cons. share in 2015 by R voted Leave in 2016 0.082 (0.13) 0.081 (0.13)
Lab. share in 2015 by R did not vote in 2016 0.048 (0.194) 0.046 (0.193)
Lab. share in 2015 by R voted Leave in 2016 0.207 (0.094) 0.207 (0.094)
UKIP share in 2015 by R did not vote in 2016 0.024 (0.118) 0.024 (0.118)
UKIP share in 2015 by R voted Leave in 2016 0.011 (0.061) 0.013 (0.061)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R did not vote in 2016 0.174 (0.125) 0.174 (0.126)
Pct. aged 18-24 by R voted Leave in 2016 0.012 (0.071) 0.013 (0.071)







TABLE S11. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of perception of MP Brexit stance, Conservative seats only, using
Heppell scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
Pct. with L4+ quals by R did not vote in 2016 0.326 (0.269) 0.329 (0.271)
Pct. with L4+ quals by R voted Leave in 2016 0.062 (0.118) 0.063 (0.118)
Pct. nonwhite by R did not vote in 2016 -0.126 (0.163) -0.13 (0.162)
Pct. nonwhite by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.098 (0.086) -0.098 (0.088)
Pct. unemployed by R did not vote in 2016 0.071 (0.171) 0.07 (0.171)
Pct. unemployed by R voted Leave in 2016 0.033 (0.076) 0.034 (0.076)
Import shock by R did not vote in 2016 0.09 (0.08) 0.093 (0.081)
Import shock by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.007 (0.038) -0.007 (0.038)
Three+ term incumbent by R did not vote in 2016 -0.057 (0.121) -0.054 (0.12)
Three+ term incumbent by R voted Leave in 2016 0.002 (0.063) 0.002 (0.063)
Cabinet member by R did not vote in 2016 -0.031 (0.169) -0.03 (0.167)
Cabinet member by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.122 (0.095) -0.119 (0.095)
2014 support for Brexit by R did not vote in 2016 0.217 (0.233) 0.223 (0.234)
2014 support for Brexit by R voted Leave in 2016 0.037 (0.102) 0.036 (0.103)
East of England by R did not vote in 2016 0.184 (0.227) 0.187 (0.229)











TABLE S11. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of perception of MP Brexit stance, Conservative seats only, using
Heppell scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
North East by R did not vote in 2016 0.315 (0.528) 0.321 (0.536)
North West by R did not vote in 2016 0.075 (0.265) 0.077 (0.267)
Scotland by R did not vote in 2016 0.293 (0.765) 0.295 (0.767)
South East by R did not vote in 2016 0.043 (0.261) 0.05 (0.262)
South West by R did not vote in 2016 0.156 (0.237) 0.154 (0.239)
Wales by R did not vote in 2016 0.157 (0.406) 0.158 (0.409)
West Midlands by R did not vote in 2016 0.281 (0.216) 0.288 (0.217)
Yorks. by R did not vote in 2016 0.006 (0.323) 0.007 (0.321)
East of England by R voted Leave in 2016 0.045 (0.119) 0.048 (0.119)
London by R voted Leave in 2016 0.037 (0.186) 0.039 (0.188)
North East by R voted Leave in 2016 0.167 (0.28) 0.172 (0.283)
North West by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.12 (0.128) -0.115 (0.131)
Scotland by R voted Leave in 2016 0.422 (0.386) 0.421 (0.381)
South East by R voted Leave in 2016 0.007 (0.117) 0.009 (0.118)
South West by R voted Leave in 2016 0.035 (0.12) 0.034 (0.121)
Wales by R voted Leave in 2016 0.24 (0.177) 0.238 (0.177)







TABLE S11. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of perception of MP Brexit stance, Conservative seats only, using
Heppell scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
West Midlands by R voted Leave in 2016 0.031 (0.129) 0.034 (0.129)
Yorks. by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.115 (0.13) -0.11 (0.132)
PTV Cons. by R did not vote in 2016 0.128 (0.083) 0.127 (0.082)
PTV Cons. by R voted Leave in 2016 0.237 (0.04) 0.238 (0.039)
PTV Lab. by R did not vote in 2016 0 (0.099) 0.002 (0.099)
PTV Lab. by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.058 (0.04) -0.058 (0.039)
PTV LibDem by R did not vote in 2016 -0.057 (0.061) -0.056 (0.061)
PTV LibDem by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.023 (0.035) -0.022 (0.035)
PTV UKIP by R did not vote in 2016 -0.043 (0.096) -0.043 (0.095)
PTV UKIP by R voted Leave in 2016 -0.004 (0.04) -0.004 (0.039)
PTV Green by R did not vote in 2016 0.043 (0.075) 0.043 (0.075)
PTV Green by R voted Leave in 2016 0 (0.029) -0.001 (0.029)
sd__(Intercept) 0.161 (0.018) 0.154 (0.017)
sd__Observation 1.154 (0.008) 1.154 (0.008)
Heppell: Europhile (cat. 1) -0.288 (0.13)
Heppell: Agnostic (cat. 2) -0.055 (0.043)
TABLE S11. Unconditional multilevel logistic regression models of perception of MP Brexit stance, Conservative seats only, using
Heppell scores. (cont.)
Term No Heppell With Heppell
Heppell: Hard Euroskeptic (cat. 4) 0.051 (0.043)
Number of obs. 11857 11857
Number of groups 238 238




















Age at referendum 0.037∗ 0.037∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Campaigned for Remain in 2016 0.312 0.312
(0.555) (0.555)
Labour MP 5.149 5.149
(4.369) (4.369)
Vote share in 2015 0.076 0.076
(0.050) (0.050)
Leave share in constituency in 2016 0.025 0.025
(0.037) (0.037)
Labour MP by vote share in 2015 −0.073 −0.073
(0.057) (0.057)
Labour MP by Leave share −0.014 −0.014
(0.044) (0.044)




Log Likelihood −124.898 −124.898
Deviance 249.796 249.796
Num. obs. 549 559
∗∗∗? < 0.001; ∗∗? < 0.01; ∗? < 0.05
APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template APSR Submission Template
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TABLE S13. Multilevel regression of MPs’ responses to survey vignettes. See text
for description of models
Baseline No expressive Rs No satisficers (1) No satisficers (2) Neither
Intercept −0.693 (3.464) −2.431 (2.856) 0.779 (2.923) 0.844 (2.986) −1.716 (2.742)
Original share 0.770 (0.085)∗∗∗ 0.839 (0.070)∗∗∗ 0.814 (0.073)∗∗∗ 0.809 (0.075)∗∗∗ 0.855 (0.068)∗∗∗
Congruence 0.140 (0.052)∗∗ 0.130 (0.042)∗∗ 0.098 (0.044)∗ 0.100 (0.045)∗ 0.112 (0.041)∗∗
Remain to Leave switch 3.469 (1.043)∗∗∗ 3.298 (0.854)∗∗∗ 2.975 (0.895)∗∗∗ 2.913 (0.924)∗∗ 2.700 (0.839)∗∗
AIC 4439.825 3779.442 4054.176 3848.817 3462.218
BIC 4465.930 3804.953 4080.057 3874.340 3487.273
Log Likelihood −2213.912 −1883.721 −2021.088 −1918.409 −1725.109
Num. obs. 573 519 552 520 481
Num. groups: uuid 96 87 96 96 87
Var: uuid (Intercept) 69.588 50.850 30.298 34.019 40.805
Var: Residual 108.509 66.280 76.966 79.630 60.965
In these models, the baseline model includes all respondents. Model “no expressive Rs” excludes
Remain-supporting respondents who estimated that the average gain for Leave to Remain switchers was
more than ten percentage points higher than the average gain (loss) for Remain to Leave switchers, and
similarly excluding Leave-supporting respondents who also estimated much higher gains for Remain to
Leave switchers than vice versa. Model “no satisficers (1)” excludes estimated votes shares of 0 or 100
percent. Model “no satisficers (2)” additionally excludes estimated vote shares which were identical
(to one decimal place) to the original vote share of the incumbent, as reported in the vignette. Model






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
TABLE S14. Multilevel regression of MPs’ responses to survey vignettes, excluding one vignette at a time
Baseline No vignette 1 No vignette 2 No vignette 3 No vignette 4 No vignette 5 No vignette 6
Intercept −0.693 (3.464) −4.053 (3.322) −0.267 (3.487) −1.892 (3.709) −3.758 (5.428) −0.255 (3.635) 8.005 (8.624)
Original share 0.770 (0.085)∗∗∗ 1.037 (0.135)∗∗∗ 0.786 (0.087)∗∗∗ 0.623 (0.124)∗∗∗ 0.826 (0.111)∗∗∗ 0.758 (0.090)∗∗∗ 0.605 (0.174)∗∗∗
Congruence 0.140 (0.052)∗∗ −0.075 (0.102) 0.133 (0.052)∗ 0.269 (0.094)∗∗ 0.153 (0.053)∗∗ 0.142 (0.054)∗∗ 0.115 (0.058)∗
Remain to Leave switch 3.469 (1.043)∗∗∗ 3.319 (0.904)∗∗∗ 2.546 (1.160)∗ 5.899 (1.806)∗∗ 3.569 (1.016)∗∗∗ 3.170 (1.142)∗∗ 5.833 (2.400)∗
AIC 4439.825 3614.789 3705.608 3750.923 3689.105 3743.396 3748.274
BIC 4465.930 3639.807 3730.613 3775.928 3714.135 3768.401 3773.279
Log Likelihood −2213.912 −1801.395 −1846.804 −1869.461 −1838.553 −1865.698 −1868.137
Num. obs. 573 478 477 477 479 477 477
Num. groups: uuid 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Var: uuid (Intercept) 69.588 83.199 57.963 68.838 62.702 67.215 74.201
Var: Residual 108.509 81.175 110.783 120.637 101.288 118.581 118.453
Note that although the coefficient on congruence is not significantly different from zero when
excluding vignette 1, the difference between the coefficient in the baseline model, and the coefficient in





































































































































FIGURE S1. Average marginal effect of a unit increase in perceived congruence upon incum-
bent voting. Full regression models are reported in Tables S7 - S9
Leave Remain All




Average marginal effect of perceived congruence








Model estimated on ... All respondents Voters only
Figure S1 shows the effects of a unit change in perceived congruence. Perceived congruence is a
variable with a range of four units and a standard deviation of 1.25 units. In order to make this estimate
comparable to a change in a binary variable of one unit (or two standard deviations, given that the
standard deviation of a dichotomous variable is ≈ 0.5), multiply the coefficient value by 2 × 1.25 = 2.5.
The effect of a two standard deviation change in perceived congruence upon all voters is therefore






























































MPs are minimally accountable for their issue stances
STATEMENT ON MISSINGNESS
Our imputed data-set includes more variables that were used in the models of vote choice. In this
section, we describe the variables featured in the multiple imputation, and their rates of missingness.
We also describe the rationale for including these variables in the multiple imputation but not in the
final model.
• Propensity to vote variables, wave 7. We include in our model of vote choice and in our
imputation model respondents’ propensity to vote for the five electorally relevant parties which
compete nationwide: the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the UK Independence
Party, and the Green Party. For each of these parties the proportion of missing responses was
47% to two significant figures. Respondents were randomly allocated to see propensity to vote
questions, and so this missingness is at random.
• Propensity to vote variables, earlier waves. We include in our imputation model (but not
in our final model) respondents’ propensity to vote for the five parties just mentioned, and
also respondents’ propensity to vote for the British National Party. The proportion of missing
responses across waves was as follows: wave 1, 81%; wave 2, 80%; wave 3; 80%; wave 4, 77%;
wave 5, 77%; wave 6, 76%.
• Fixed respondent characteristics. We include in our imputation model (but not in our final
model) selected demographic characteristics of respondents: their age group, their gender,
ethnicity, and their highest educational qualification. There were no missing values for gender,
ethnicity, qualifications or age group. We include these variables in our imputation model
but not our vote choice model because (a) these variables are useful in imputing weights (see
below); and because (b) we believe these variables to matter for vote choice only through their
effect on propensity to vote.
• Constituency characteristics We include a large range of constituency characteristics in our
model. With one exception, there were no missing values. The sole exception was the value
of import shock for four constituencies which saw minor boundary changes (Milton Keynes
North; Milton Keynes South; Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale & Tweeddale; Edinburgh South)
• Challenger position 35% of values for this variable were missing. Relative to the baseline
party (Conservative challengers), rates of missingness were significant for only two parties:
the Liberal Democrats and the UK Independence Party. Since these parties had very strong
Remain and Leave positions, we judge the risk of faulty inference due to inaccurate imputation
to be minimal.
TABLE S15. Missingness of challenger position by challenger party
Observed Missing
Conservative and Unionist Party 87 68
Green Party 3 0
Labour Party 118 80
Liberal Democrats 42 12
Other 0 2
Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales 3 2
Scottish National Party (SNP) 1 1
UK Independence Party (UKIP) 82 23





































































































































to vote Conservative in wave 7. By over-imputing and creating imputations for observed values, we
can judge whether the imputed values are, in some sense, accurate. Figure S2 shows scaled values of
variable ‘ptvConW7‘ against 100 over-imputations (20 draws from an approximate normal distribution
for each imputed data-set). Each plotted point is surrounded by a line showing the 90% prediction
interval. Intervals which fail to encompass the observed value are shown in red. The solid line shows
the ordinary least squares fit between the original and imputed values.























Plot shows mean over−imputed value with 90% intervals
Coverage is approximately nominal at 91%
The plot shows that the imputed values are accurate and a good guide to the original values. The
coverage of the imputed values is slightly better than nominal. Additionally, the OLS fit has a slope
close to one and an intercept close to zero, indicating that the imputed values are not attenuated versions
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SURVEY OF MPS
Below we report the questions asked of the MPs in our survey:
Preface:
We would now like to ask you some hypothetical questions about Brexit and the 2017
election.
Please try and answer these questions setting aside your own views on Brexit.
Q1:
An estimated 62% of voters in Enfield Southgate voted to Remain in the 2016 referendum.
The sitting MP, David Burrowes (Con.), campaigned for Leave in that referendum.
His main opponent, Bambos Charalambous (Lab.), supported Remain.
In the 2017 general election, Burrowes won 20,634 votes, or 42.7%, compared to
Charalambous who won 51.7%.
Now suppose that Burrowes had campaigned for Remain instead.
How many votes would Burrowes have won had he switched to support Remain? Please
give your answer as a percentage.
Q2:
An estimated 50% of voters in Colne Valley voted to Leave in the 2016 referendum. The
sitting MP, Jason McCartney (Con.), campaigned for Leave in that referendum.
His main opponent, Thelma Walker (Lab.), supported Remain.
In the 2017 general election, McCartney won just under 28,000 votes, or 46.1%, compared
to Walker who won 47.8%.
Now suppose that McCartney had campaigned for Remain instead.
How many votes would McCartney have won had he switched to support Remain? Please
give your answer as a percentage.
Q3:
An estimated 61% of voters in Peterborough voted to Leave in the 2016 referendum. The
sitting MP, Stewart Jackson (Con.), campaigned for Leave in that referendum.
His main opponent, Fiona Onasanya (Lab.), supported Remain.
In the 2017 general election, Jackson won 22,343 votes, or 46.8%, compared to Onasanya
who won 48.1%.
Now suppose that Jackson had campaigned for Remain instead.
How many votes would Jackson have won had he switched to support Remain? Please
give your answer as a percentage.
Q4:
An estimated 61% of voters in Leeds East voted to Leave in the 2016 referendum. The
sitting MP, Richard Burgon (Lab.), campaigned for Remain in that referendum.





































































































































In the 2017 general election, Burgon won over 25,000 votes, or 61.4%, compared to
Robinson who won 30.6%.
Now suppose that Burgon had campaigned for Leave instead.
How many votes would Burgon have won had he switched to support Leave? Please give
your answer as a percentage.
Q5:
An estimated 50% of voters in Bromley and Chislehurst voted to Leave in the 2016
referendum. The sitting MP, Bob Neill (Con.), campaigned for Remain in that referendum.
His main opponent, Sara Hyde (Lab.), supported Remain.
In the 2017 general election, Neil won just over 25,000 votes, or 54%, compared to Hyde
who won 33.4%.
Now suppose that Neill had campaigned for Leave instead.
How many votes would Neill have won had he switched to support Leave? Please give
your answer as a percentage.
Q6:
An estimated 62% of voters in Reading East voted to Remain in the 2016 referendum. The
sitting MP, Rob Wilson (Con.), campaigned for Remain in that referendum.
His main opponent, Matt Rodda (Lab.), supported Remain.
In the 2017 general election, Wilson won over 23,000 votes, or 42.3%, compared to Rodda
who won 49%.
Now suppose that Wilson had campaigned for Leave instead.
How many votes would Wilson have won had he switched to support Leave? Please give
your answer as a percentage.
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